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Abstract 
Since 2012, the European aviation sector is covered by the European Union Emission Trading 
Scheme, (EU ETS). A global counterpart, which is currently being developed by the International 
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) under the name CORSIA, is due to enter into force in 2021. 
Over 70 countries, including the EU member states, have announced their participation in the 
scheme. CORSIA has, however, been criticised for its voluntary nature and weak environmental 
standards. Drawing on neoliberal institutionalist assumptions, this study will provide an 
understanding of why the European Commission has decided to support a transition from the EU 
ETS to CORSIA, despite the risk that this would undermine the EU’s common environmental 
targets. In addition to providing an understanding of the Commission’s standpoint, this study will 
seek to contribute to the further development of neoliberal institutionalism. By applying a neoliberal 
institutionalist framework in combination with the method of qualitative concept analysis on the 
empirical data, consisting of different materials produced by the Commission, the study shows that 
the Commission’s support for a transition from the EU ETS towards CORSIA could be explained 
by neoliberal institutionalist assumptions about mutual interests and interdependence. However, this 
study suggest that to make the theoretical framework better fit for this study and similar studies, the 
analytical framework must recognise both state and non-state actors and take the temporal aspect of 
interests into account. 
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Acronyms 
Organisations 
CORSIA - Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation 
EEA - European Economic Area 
EU - European Union  
EU ETS - EU Emission Trading Scheme 
ICAO - International Civil Aviation Organizations 
Other acronyms 
ETS - Emission Trading Schemes 
GHG - Green House Gas 
MEP - Member of the European Parliament 
MRV - Monitoring, reporting and verification 
NDC - National Determined Contribution 
SARPs - Standards and Recommended Practices 
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Introduction  
At a time where climate change is becoming increasingly debated, new research and emission 
reduction measures are developed, the formation of global environmental institutions is more 
relevant than ever before. In recent years the development of global and regional instruments for 
aviation emission reduction has begun. In this context, the EU introduced its Emission trading 
scheme in 2005, with the purpose of reducing green house gas (GHG) emissions released by 
companies, covering many different sectors.  In parallel to the EU ETS, the initiative was taken by 1
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to develop the Carbon Offsetting and 
Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA). 
The EU has for many years worked for an expansion of the EU ETS. It has also showed its interest 
for a global scheme and supported the development of CORSIA. The decision to support this global 
scheme is the specific focus of this research. What makes this puzzling is the fact that CORSIA is a 
voluntary scheme with rules and targets not yet agreed upon. First, previous research point to the 
fact that it is not recommended to build a global emission trading scheme on a voluntary basis. 
Second, it is hard for the international community to agree upon common rules. There is a possible 
risk that the EU will have to lower its own environmental ambitions, as well as loosing its ability to 
decide on its own desired price for allowances. Moreover, based on the set EU environmental 
targets it appears puzzling that the European Commission expresses its support for CORSIA, even 
if it is not considered the most effective alternative from an environmental perspective. The fact that 
the Commission is aware of CORSIA’s weaknesses but still advocates a transition makes the issue 
even more puzzling. 
To provide an understanding of this puzzle, this study will make use of a neoliberal institutionalist 
framework. This theoretical framework will be combined with the method of qualitative concept 
analysis. The empirical data consist of a debate and a hearing on CORSIA in the European 
Parliament attended by the responsible Commissioners, as well as of several written documents, 
including legislative acts and communications put forward by the Commission.  
Differences in voluntary and mandatory arrangements and how actors relate to these constitute a 
fundamental problem in international politics. To provide an understanding of this fundamental 
 European Commission, Phases 1 and 2 (2005-2012).1
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issue, that is, why different international arrangements clashes and why actors are drawn between 
mandatory and voluntary agreements, neoliberal institutionalism is considered as a suitable 
theoretical starting point. Neoliberal institutionalism starts from the assumption that international 
cooperation generates mutual benefits for states. Following the neoliberal institutionalist line of 
thought, it could be argued that international institutions opens up an arena for economic and 
political exchanges within the international system.  The theory is, as this study will show, however, 2
not without weaknesses. Identified theoretical gaps are the theory’s narrow focus on states and 
neglect of the temporal aspect of actors interests. 
The overall purpose of this study is to provide a better understanding of the interests behind the 
formation of international environmental institutions. The specific aim of this study is twofold. 
First, this study aims at explaining why the Commission is supporting CORSIA, despite the risk 
that this would undermine the EU’s common environmental targets. Building on the theoretical gaps 
identified above, the study will also seek to contribute to the further development of neoliberal 
institutionalism. 
The discussion on a global scheme for emission reduction is not new, as the EU for a long time has 
desired to expand its own regional scheme and several studies has been conducted within the field 
of emission trading. However, since the discussion became more relevant after the increased focus 
on the development of CORSIA in 2016, almost no studies have yet been made on the relationship 
between EU ETS and CORSIA. Particularly not on the Commission’s motives for a transition to the 
global scheme. This further justifies the purpose of this study.  
The specific research question that this study will answer is how can neoliberal institutionalism 
explain why the European Commission, despite the identified risks, is in favour of a transition from 
the EU ETS towards CORSIA? 
To answer this question, this study will start by giving a brief background of the two emission 
reduction instruments of relevance for this study and the problems that has emerged. These 
problems are then discussed in relation to previous research. The following section account for the 
development of the theoretical framework of neoliberal institutionalism. The relation between 
 Keohane, Robert. O & Nye, Joseph. (2001) Power and interdependence. Longman, p. 182
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theory and the method of qualitative concept analysis will be further explained in the method 
section. The theoretical framework of neoliberal institutionalism will be applied to the case of EU 
ETS and CORSIA in order to answer the research question. Findings from this analysis will then be 
reapplied on the framework of neoliberal institutionalism, in order to possible contribute to the 
development of the theory. All results will be discussed in the final chapter.  
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Two schemes for emission reduction: the EU ETS and CORSIA 
Before entering into the theoretical and analytical discussion, it is important to provide an 
understanding of the two emission reduction instruments that are at the centre of this study, that is, 
the EU ETS and CORSIA. The purpose of this chapter is to clarify the differences between the two 
schemes, in order contribute to a better appreciation of the research puzzle.  
With regards to the EU ETS, this is a so-called cap-and-trade based scheme, meaning that an 
emission cap limits the amount of GHGs that European companies can emit. European companies 
that want to emit more than this cap must either buy allowances from companies that emit below 
the cap or reduce their production.  This makes it more expensive for companies to release GHGs, 3
which is consistent with the idea that ”the costs of pollution should be borne by the entity which 
profits from the process that causes pollution”.  In line with its ambition to expand the EU ETS, the 4
EU has established links between the EU ETS and a number of non-EU emission trading schemes 
(ETSs). The linking agreement between the EU and Switzerland is one example. The EU is also 
negotiating an agreement between the EU and Australia.  5
The aviation sector was integrated into the EU ETS in 2012. As a result, operating airlines in 
Europe must now pay for their emissions.  The EU ETS was intended to cover all flights starting 6
from or arriving in the European Economic Area (EEA) . However, this proposal received major 7
complaints from outside the EU, which led to the so-called ”Stop the Clock” decision , which 8
limits the scope of the EU ETS to flights operating within the EEA and postpones the inclusion of 
intercontinental flights.  9
In contrast with the cap-and-trade based regional scope of the EU ETS, CORSIA is set to become a 
global market based mechanism designed as an offset-scheme.  The idea of the scheme is that 10
participating states can compensate for their own emissions by investing in GHG reducing measures 
 European Commission, Emission Trading System (EU ETS).3
 Ambec, Stefan and Ehlers, Lars. (2010) Regulation via the Polluter-Pays Principle, Montreal., p. 2 4
 European Commission, International carbon market.5
 European Commission, Phases 1 and 2 (2005-2012).6
 EU 28 plus Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway.7
!  Scheelhaase, Janina., Maertens, Sven., Grimme, Wolfgang., & Jung, Martin (2017) ”EU ETS versus CORSIA – A critical 8
assessment of two approaches to limit air transport's CO2 emissions by market-based measures”, Journal of Air Transport 
Management 67: 55-62., p. 56-59
 European Parliament (2017) Aviation emissions: MEPs reach deal with Council.9
 Scheelhaase et al. (2017)., p. 57-2810
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in other countries and regions.  In the case of CORSIA, credits are tradable and serves to create 11
compliance between participating states. The scheme is supposed to work for carbon neutral growth 
from the year of 2020. This is going to be performed by the aviation sector, purchasing credits or 
making investments in carbon reduction projects in other sectors and regions around the world.  12
The first voluntary pilot phase of the scheme is supposed enter into force 2021.  The second phase 13
that will begin after 2026 will be mandatory for all ”ICAO Contracting States”.  14
The scope of the EU ETS and CORSIA 
In 2016, the EU ratified the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. Following the ratification, the 
Commission introduced the so called National Determined Contribution (NDC), also known as the 
40 percent targets, with the purpose of making sectors within the EU ETS reach a 40 percent 
emission reduction in 2030 (compared to 2005 levels).  As the aviation sector is an important part 15
in reaching this target, the EU ETS covers all emissions from aviation within the EEA, including 
domestic flights. The EU ETS includes all EU states as well as Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. 
The first phase of CORSIA covers 71 states, participating on a voluntary basis. CORSIA, which is 
supposed to be the international scheme, only covers flights between participating states and the 
scheme also differ from the EU ETS since participants within the scheme only have to report and 
compensate for post-2020 emissions. It is possible to see clear differences, both environmental and 
competitive, between the two schemes.  The Commission has sought support from the member 16
states to participate in CORSIAs first phase, despite the fact that the targets and objectives of 
CORSIA are still not yet agreed upon. Moreover, even though CORSIA covers states on an 
international basis, all ICAO participants are not obliged to participate in the mandatory phase of 
CORSIA. As explained by Scheelhaase et al. ICAO ”excludes states whose carriers have a 
combined share of international aviation activities in RTKs [Revenue Tonne-kilometres] in the year 
2018 not exceeding 0.5% of total (global) RTKs. In some cases, this leads to strange effects since 
routes to, from or between countries with high air traffic volumes but a lack of (in a worldwide 
context) significant home carriers may be excluded from the scheme.”  This means that, according 17
to todays regulation, emissions released on these routes are left out form CORSIA. In addition, 
 European Commission (2005), The Kyoto Protocol., p. 4-5 11
 Scheelhaase et al. (2017)., p. 57-2812
 Carbon Market Watch (2018) EU Member States resist industry pressures to protect climate regulation.13
 Scheelhaase et al. (2017)., p. 57-2814
 Scheelhaase et al. (2017)., p. 59-6015
 Scheelhaase et al. (2017)., p. 56-5816
 Scheelhaase et al. (2017)., p. 57-5917
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CORSIA does not include domestic flights. The entering into force of the global scheme would thus 
leave all air traffic within the participating states without sufficient rules. The Commission’s 
decision to support CORSIA would possibly result in a change of the aviation sector within the EU 
ETS, which may have an impact on the EU commitments to the Paris agreement.  18
The progress of CORSIA 
ICAO-member states have been expected to implement CORSIAs Standards and Recommended 
Practices (SARPs) for monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) from early 2019. Based on an 
ICAO State Letter sent on 20 July 2018, the organisation gave its member states a time limit to file 
any disapproval with the SARPs. This limit was set to October 22, 2018. In addition, member states 
had until 1 of December 2018 to file differences with the SARPs and their national regulation.  19
Following the ICAO request, the Commission instructed the member states to file the existing 
differences between the EU ETS Directive 2003/87/EC and the CORSIA. The scope of the EU ETS 
directive will continue for the time being, while the Commission continue to work on regulations in 
accordance with CORSIA and from the 1 of January 2021 the CORSIA offsetting requirements are 
supposed to apply for the member states. CORSIAs MRV-standards was however approved and 
implemented in the EU from January 2019.  A CORSIA regulation for emission reduction has not 20
yet been established. The quota of emissions international airlines need to offset will be decided 
based on emissions reported by the aviation sector under the period 2019-2020.  21
As set out in the above discussion, many differences exist between the two schemes, particularly 
fundamental differences in the two schemes environmental targets, making the objectives of 
CORSIA to be significantly weaker than the EU ETS.  Even though the EU and its member states 22
have formulated strict targets in accordance with the Paris agreement, the Commission has decided 
to support and started to prepare for the transition to the not yet finalised and potentially 
environmental weaker CORSIA. The Commission still, however, underscores the importance of a 
 Scheelhaase et al. (2017)., p. 5918
 VedderPrice (2018). ICAO CORSIA Update: Compliance Complexities Under ICAO’s New Carbon Offsetting Scheme.19
 Council of the European Union (2018) Council decision 2018/0372 on the position to be taken on behalf of the European Union 20
within the International Civil Aviation Organization in respect of the First Edition of the International Standards and Recommended 
Practices on Environmental Protection – Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA)., p. 1-3
 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) .../... of 6.3.2019 supplementing Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of 21
the Council as regards measures adopted by the International Civil Aviation Organisation for the monitoring, reporting and 
verification of aviation emissions for the purpose of implementing a global market-based measure., p. 3
 ENVI committee meeting in the European Parliament 19-11-2018. Item number two on the agenda: Exchange of views with Ms 22
Violeta Bulc, Commissioner for Transport, on ICAO's CORSIA developments., Transcript p. 3-5
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united support for the global scheme. CORSIA is a voluntary scheme and the EU ETS is mandatory, 
which can be considered as a problem. This will be developed further in the next section.  
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Previous research on emission trading  
This section will discuss previous research within the field of emission trading. This serves to 
situate the study within the broader context of environmental agreements and emission reduction 
literature and thereby create a better understanding of the problem within the field of emission 
reduction instruments. 
A significant number of studies on ETSs focus on the possible linking of different ETSs, which 
could potentially lead to the formation of a global scheme, as seen above something which the EU 
also has shown interest in. In their study on emission trading, Perdan and Azapagic explain how 
differences between ETSs, as well as their host countries may hinder an effective combination of 
ETSs and the creation of a global scheme. They particularly focus on the host countries different 
political and economic set-up, which affect the design of the schemes.  At the same time, they 23
maintain that the development of a global ETS would bring benefits to the participating states and 
result in a leveled playing field for companies covered by emissions trading as well as reduce their 
abatement costs.  The reduced scope of the EU ETS is limited to European countries within the 24
EEA and the global scheme of CORSIA has no finalised  number of participating states. In line with 
the authors thoughts on ETSs, and with regards to the case of EU ETS and CORSIA, it might be 
reasonable to argue that even though there are a number of differences between these countries, the 
European countries still have a common cultural and long established administrative foundation. 
Participating countries of the global scheme of CORSIA differ to a greater extent and the scheme 
has a weaker administrative capacity with targets not yet agreed upon.  
Metcalf and Weisbach, for their part, discusses the impact of emission allowance prices on the 
effectiveness of ETS linkages. They hold that for linkage to be effective, it is important that the 
linked scheme use the same emission allowance price. Different allowance prices across the linked 
schemes are likely to result in efficiency losses, also known as carbon leakages, meaning that 
carbon-intensive industry leaves its country of origin to seek the lowest prices. Linking various 
schemes with different rules and standards together will therefore generally reduce the price on 
emission permits.  Implicitly, Metcalf and Weisbachs research seems to suggest that companies are 25
 Perdan, Slobodan. and Azapagic, Adisa (2011) ”Carbon trading: Current schemes and future developments”, Energy Policy 39: 23
6040–6054., p. 6047-6050
 Perdan, Slobodan. and Azapagic, Adisa (2011). p. 6047-604824
 Gilbert E. Metcalf and David Weisbach (2011) ”Linking Policies When Tastes Differ: Global Climate Policy in a Heterogeneous 25
World” Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Volume 6, Issue 1, 1 January 2012, Pages 110–129., p. 110, 112-113
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rational actors, making their choices based on what is most in line with their self-interests, an issue 
that will be further developed in the theoretical discussion. In the case of EU ETS and CORSIA, the 
absence of sufficient rules would possible encourage airlines within the EU ETS to buy allowances 
or to use offset credits from where the prices would be lowest, in this case from CORSIA. 
In line with Metcalf and Weisbach, Stranlund maintains that the level of compliance among states 
changes in relation to the price on allowances. He argues that linking different schemes together can 
both increase and decrease actors compliance. The linkage between two countries emission trading 
schemes using different prices on allowances would not only equalise the price in the long run, it is 
also likely that the level of compliance will increase in the country where the price is lower and vice 
versa. The importance of taking enforcement strategies into consideration when linking emission 
schemes is therefore underlined as important since synced enforcement strategies between the 
linked schemes would adjust potential compliance issues. Anyhow, due to compliance issues, 
Stranlund suggests that the development of regional and national linked global emission schemes 
seems more likely than a unitary global scheme,  an argument of direct relevance to the 26
development of the EU ETS and CORSIA. Also Stranlund’s research seems to start from the 
assumption that states and other actors follow a rational logic and look to the most cost-effective 
alternative. Compliance problems may be an issue without a common price on the schemes 
emission allowances. Based on this, it might be reasonable to believe that enforcement is an 
important part of participating actors compliance during a linkage of ETSs. The prices on permits 
might also decrease, if sufficient rules are not decided on. Since the international community has a 
hard time deciding on common rules, there is a risk that the price on permits might fall under the 
EU-preferred level if a transfer from the EU ETS to CORSIA would be a reality. 
Also Aakre and Hovis focus on compliance in their study on mandatory and voluntary ETSs. With 
regard to voluntary schemes, the authors point to two factors that motivates actors to participate in 
ETSs even if they are not forced to, which is the case in mandatory schemes. The first factor is self-
interest, for instance economic or environmental interests. The second factor is a willingness to do 
good, that is, what is in the interest of the public as established by norms.  They further suggest 27
 Stranlund John. K (2017) ”The Economics of Enforcing Emissions Markets” Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 26
Volume 11, Issue 2, 1 July 2017, Pages 227–246., p. 241-242
 Aakre, Stine. and Hovi, Jon (2010) ”Emission trading: Participation enforcement determines the need for compliance 27
enforcement”, European Union Politics 11(3): 427–445., p. 430
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that mandatory schemes generally have lower compliance than voluntary schemes.  Despite the 28
lack of correlation in their findings between enforcement and compliance, the authors do not 
advocate for the formation of a global emission trading scheme without a sufficient level of 
enforcement. The reason for this is that they suggest that compliance enforcement is an important 
factor when it comes to building trust in the market for permits among participants. Enforcement is 
also seen as an instrument to ensure participation, as well as a useful tool for making self-interested 
states motivated to cooperate.  As such, this research could arguable not be used to explain the 29
Commission’s decision to support a transition from the EU ETS, a mandatory scheme, towards 
CORSIA, a voluntary scheme. Instead Aakre and Hovis conclusion, advocating for compliance 
enforcement within global ETSs, makes a stronger case for this specific study. However, their 
findings might be useful in explaining how different factors motivate actors to form or participate in 
ETSs. 
A number of scholars have also studied problems that may arise when different ETSs are running in 
parallel, linking them together without sufficient rules. Double counting is one such problem, which 
means that ”a single greenhouse gas emission reduction or removal is used more than once to 
demonstrate compliance with mitigation targets.”  To prevent this problem, there is a need for solid 30
emission MRV-rules and two or more schemes linked together would need to be coordinated and 
rely on the same MRV-standards.  In relation to this, Stranlund underscores the difficulties in 31
obtaining emission data from ETSs participants. There is essential that this data is accurate for the 
emission trading scheme to work. The EU has good experience of emission monitoring within the 
EU ETS. However, many other schemes rely on firms self estimation of emissions, hence the 
imminent risk of imperfect monitoring and reporting in many ETSs.  It is necessary to highlight 32
that ”monitoring activities are not simply limited to the performance of an offset project. Typically, 
offset projects must be additional, meaning that the emissions reduction would not have occurred 
without the project.”  There is therefore an extensive demand for gathering of data. Some of the 33
developing countries who holds a large supply of credits, do not possesses the possibility or 
enforcement capacity to monitor the system of offset credits, which can lead to trading of credits 
 Aakre, Stine. and Hovi, Jon (2010)., p. 431-432, 440-442 28
 Aakre, Stine. and Hovi, Jon (2010)., p. 441. 29
 Climate Focus (2015) Double Counting in the Paris Agreement, Briefing Note.30
 Perdan, Slobodan. and Azapagic, Adisa (2011)., p. 6048-604931
 Stranlund John. K (2017)., p. 24032
 Stranlund John. K (2017)., p. 24233
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that is not valid to be counted as emission reduction.  As already mentioned above, the EU has 34
accepted to implement ICAOs MRV-standards from early 2019. But, since there is still no finalised 
rules or treaty for the CORSIA scheme there is still a fear that, if the two schemes would be brought 
together in order to work in parallel, there would be a possible risk of double-counting.  However, 35
it is not always easy to ensure that the use of offsets in other countries actually contributes to 
emission reduction. This process demands high administrative capacity and monitoring standards.  36
The EU ETS is backed by the EU, its machinery and administration. At the same time, CORSIA is 
not an international organisation. In accordance with Stranlunds way of arguing there may be 
differences in countries' ways of managing their monitoring and verification. Without sufficient 
rules the combination of different schemes will increase the risk of errors in emission monitoring as 
well as the possibilities for companies to cheat with the monitoring and reporting. There might be a 
problem that the EU is used to emission monitoring in a way that other countries are not. 
The study of Scheelhaase et al. specifically focuses on the implementation of CORSIA and its 
potential effects on the EU ETS. The authors outline a few options for how the EU could eventually 
proceed when the pilot phase of CORSIA begin. Option one would be to continue with the reduced 
scope of the EU ETS until the first phase of CORSIA enter into force. The aviation sector within the 
EU ETS will then be phased out and cease to exist. The second option would be to introduce the full 
scope of the aviation sector within the EU ETS. When CORSIA enter into force, the EU would need 
to leave the cooperation due to the risk of double counting in using parallel schemes. Within the 
third option, the reduced scope would continue after the entering into force of CORSIA, covering 
flights within EEA. CORSIA rules would apply on international flights. In the fourth option, the EU 
dismantle the aviation sector from the EU ETS, which is completely replaced by CORSIA. 
Domestic flights within the EEA are voluntarily included in CORSIA. The last and fifth option 
according to the authors, would be for the EU to exclude the aviation sector from the EU ETS and 
agree to implement CORSIA’s rules on international flights. Domestic flights would still be 
unregulated, but all other flights would be covered by CORSIA. The authors come to the conclusion 
that the second option would be the most beneficial from an environmental perspective. However, 
they underline that the first option is where the EU seems to aim right now, according to the 
Commission’s latest proposal (Regulation (EU) 2017/2392). The third option would anyhow bring a 
 Stranlund John. K (2017)., p. 242-24334
 Transport & Environment Aviation in the ETS.35
 Stranlund John. K (2017)., p. 24236
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larger environmental benefit than the first option, since two schemes together would share the 
responsibility of domestic, EEA- and international flights. It is also possible to argue that the third 
option would reach a higher acceptance by external actors than the second option. The third option 
would however need extensively developed rules and regulations, especially regarding standards on 
monitoring, reporting and verification.  Even though it is not the most effective option from an 37
environmental point of view the Commission is expressing its support for CORSIA (Scheelhaase et 
als first option). This indicates that the Commission sees greater benefits with a global cooperation 
than a regional one, even if a full scope EU ETS, according to research, would result in larger 
environmental benefits. From this backdrop, Scheelhaase et al. therefore suggest that the best option 
from an combined environmental and competitive perspective would be to continue with the 
reduced scope of the EU ETS (flights within the EEA) and to use CORSIA in order to coverer 
international flights. A parallel use of the schemes would in that way cover the most possible of the 
aviation sector.  Even though the competitive impacts of the two approaches, full or reduced scope, 38
of the EU ETS are calculated to be small, given that the prices on allowances today are low, 
Scheelhaase et al. point out that a parallel use still comes with the risk of rerouting air traffic to 
airports outside of Europe. Seen from an environmental perspective only, the authors reach the 
conclusion that a full scope use of the EU ETS would be the most beneficial.  39
From this discussion it appears puzzling that even though the first option is not the most beneficial 
from an environmental perspective, and that it might be hard for the EU to reach its commitments to 
the Paris agreement with a transfer to the offsetting scheme of CORSIA, the Commission still strive 
for a global scheme where the aviation sector within the EU ETS would risk to be dismantled. This 
is also demonstrated in option four and five. What could explain the Commission’s support is the 
strive of possible long-term benefits that may come from such cooperation. In the long run, when 
CORSIA covers all ICAO-states, it might have a greater environmental impact than it is predicted to 
have short/mid-term.  
From previous research it is possible to see different reasons for states to enter into international 
institutions. Price is an important factor, affecting actors choices and compliance, which points to 
the rational nature of actors in ETSs. Different interests, and temporal perspectives, influence the 
 Scheelhaase et al. (2017)., p. 6037
 Scheelhaase et al. (2017)., p. 55-5738
 Scheelhaase et al. (2017)., p. 5939
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willingness of forming international institutions. Research also underlines the importance of 
enforcement within global schemes, something CORSIA does not make use of during the voluntary 
phase. The combination of different schemes has also proven to be complicated and the lack of 
sufficient rules and targets makes linking ineffective. One motive for the Commission to promote 
the agreement might be the fact that they potentially operate with different temporal perspectives 
than for example companies or other non-state actors. The fact that different kinds of actors, acting 
under their rationality, choose with different temporal perspectives is not taken into account in the 
theory, means that the case of international emission reduction agreements offers the possibility of 
theory development. 
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Theory 
To provide an understanding of why the Commission has chosen to support the development of a 
global emission reduction scheme, this study makes use of a neoliberal institutionalist framework. 
The theoretical framework mainly builds on the neoliberal institutional works of Keohane and Nye, 
as they can be considered as the founding fathers of neoliberal institutionalism. In the first section, 
this chapter will briefly introduce neoliberal institutionalist theory. Based on this introduction, the 
remaining sections will develop the three analytical dimensions that will constitute this study’s 
analytical framework and also suggest where the study might contribute to developing the theory. 
Introduction to neoliberal institutionalism 
Neoliberal institutionalist theory, as developed by Keohane and Nye, builds on the assumption that 
states are rational and self-interested actors in an anarchic system.  In this system, power is 40
important, but does not derive solely from military force.  Instead, economic power, including 41
trade, is emphasised, giving rise to interdependent relationships.  This basic assumption contributes 42
to the understanding of why states come together to create institutions. 
In a neoliberal institutionalist world, states see cooperations, which brings improved information 
exchange, as a way to gain mutual benefits.  Instead of seeking relative gains, what they care about 43
are absolute gains.  Hence, they are willing to give up part of their sovereignty to engage in 44
international cooperations.  The belief in cooperation makes states more inclined to form 45
institutions, resulting in common rules and norms, which affect how they behave internationally. 
This means that institutions both create opportunities for states and restrict their actions. In the 
absence of institutions, actors in the international system would lack an arena to share 
understandings and expectations.  This assumption is the corner stone of neoliberal institutionalist 46
theory. 
 Danish, Kyle. (2008) International Relations Theory. Oxford Handbooks Online., p. 5-740
 Keohane, Robert. O & Nye, Joseph. (1987) ”Power and Interdependence Revisited” International Organization, Vol. 41, No. 4, 41
725-753., p. 733
 Keohane, Robert. O & Nye, Joseph. (1987)., p. 74742
 Danish, Kyle. (2008)., p. 5-7 43
and  
Keohane, Robert. O & Nye, Joseph. (1987)., p. 747
 Keohane, Robert. O. (1990) ”Multilateralism - an agenda for research”. Internal journal Vol. XLV, Iss. 4, 731-764, p. 73444
 Danish, Kyle. (2008)., p. 5-745
 Keohane, Robert. O & Nye, Joseph. (1987)., p. 747 46
and 
Keohane, Robert. O. (1990)., p. 734
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Keohane defines international institutions as ”persistent and connected sets of rules (formal or 
informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations.”  International 47
organisations, that is, formal intergovernmental entities with ”legal standing, physical headquarters, 
executive head [and] staff” , is one form of international institution. However, also states and softer 48
arrangements like sovereignty or neutrality are considered international institutions.  Institutions 49
can not be examined without mentioning regimes, which according to Krasner can be defined as 
”sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which 
actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations.”  Keohane and Nye, for 50
their part, define regimes as governing arrangements whereby states, in ”creating or accepting 
procedures, rules, or institutions for certain kinds of activity, […] regulate and control transnational 
and interstate relations.”  As provided by these definitions, the concepts of institutions and regimes 51
are close to identical. However, while regimes can be considered norms and rules for action, 
institutions can be understood as strongly linked norms and rules of action upheld by named 
agents.  This study however does not make any distinction between the two concepts since they 52
both entail the cooperative aspect of importance for this research. International institutions will 
therefore be used to denominate the comprehensive set off different norms and rules of action 
governing the behavior of international agents. 
Pollack’s study on the EU is a concrete example of how neoliberal institutionalism can be applied to 
provide an understanding of why states enter international institutions. Starting from neoliberal 
institutionalist assumptions, Pollack explains how EU member states delegate power to the 
European institutions in order to reduce transaction costs of implementing common policies, and in 
doing so give up part of their sovereignty. The author also emphasises how the EU helps fill 
information gaps, provides expertise, ensures that commitments agreed upon are credible, monitors 
compliance, and sets the agenda.  As such, Pollack’s argument is consistent with the neoliberal 53
institutionalist assumption that states are rational actors that enter institutions to gain mutual 
benefits. In the same neoliberal institutionalist spirit, Mitchell, moreover, highlights how 
 Keohane, Robert. O. (1988) ”International Institutions: Two Approaches” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 4, pp. 47
379-396., p. 383
 Thomas G. Weiss & Rorden Wilkinson (2013) International Organization and Global Governance, Taylor and Francis, p. 748
 Keohane, Robert. O. (1988)., p. 38349
 Krasner, Stephen. D. (1982) “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,” International 50
Organization 36, no. 2., p. 186
 Keohane, Robert. O & Nye, Joseph. (2001)., p. 551
 Thomas G. Weiss & Rorden Wilkinson (2013)., p. 7-852
 Pollack, Mark. (2003) The Engines of European Integration: Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the EU. Oxford., p. 653
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international institutions can bring mutual benefits when it comes to environment, by introducing 
common environmental measures that influence global environmental behaviour.  In spite of many 54
scholars successful use of neoliberal institutionalism, it should be noted that many have also pointed 
to certain gaps in the theory. To give but one example, Pevehouse discards neoliberal 
institutionalism in his studies on international organisations, arguing that it tends to ignore domestic 
politics.  Here it would also be reasonable to underscore the one-sided focus on states in 55
international institutions and the negligence of other types of actors. Studying how different kinds 
of actors interact to construct international institutions – like CORSIA – may contribute to 
developing the theory. 
As the EU ETS and CORSIA can be considered institutions from the above discussed definition, 
neoliberal institutionalism makes a suitable framework. Due to the cross-border nature of 
environmental challenges international institutions are more effective in addressing these than are 
individual states. This justifies the choice of theory.  The following sections will develop and 56
discuss the key dimensions that make up this study’s analytical framework.  
Analytical framework 
Based on the above introduction to neoliberal institutionalism, three dimensions, each consisting of 
two parameters, will be used: (1) agency (states – non-state actors), (2) dependence 
(interdependence – independence), and (3) logic of choice (rational choice – norm based choice). 
 
Figure 1: Analytical framework 
 Mitchell, Ronald. B (2003) How institutions change: perspectives on social learning in global and local environmental contexts., p. 54
35-36, 46-47.
 Pevehouse, Jon. C. (2002) Democracy from the Outside-In? International Organizations and Democratization, International 55
Organization 56, 3, pp. 515-549., p. 518
 Saryal, Rajnish (2015) ”Global Environmental Agenda: The Neoliberal Institutional Perspective” Jadavpur Journal of 56
International Relations 19(1) 1–21., p. 1-2, 6
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Non-state actorsStates
Rational choice
Interdependence Independence
Norm-based choice
These dimensions will serve as a filter in the search for keywords in the empirical material, that 
indicate a neoliberal institutionalist way of thinking. As will be seen, there is a certain overlap 
between the three dimensions that is unavoidable due to the interconnected nature of neoliberal 
institutionalist assumptions. The division is however necessary to allow for a systematic filtering of 
the chosen material. 
Agency: States – Non-state actors 
The first dimension that will be developed is that of agency within institutions. Modern neoliberal 
institutionalist scholars often recognise the importance of non-state actors, like transnational 
businesses within the international system. However, with regard to agency within international 
institutions, this is almost exclusively limited to states.  Accordingly, Keohane and Nye refute the 57
modernist view of a world order characterised by multinational corporations, international social 
movements and organisations rather than by territorial states.  Following their example, also 58
Mitchell focuses mainly on state agency. However, he also accredit some agency to various non-
institutional actors, such as private corporations, civil society, and non-governmental organisations, 
and explain how they can both be influenced by and influence international institutions.  This is 59
further discussed by Saryal, who holds that international organisations, companies, local actors, 
social groups, individuals and other non-state actors are as important as states.  He holds that ”[t]he 60
problem of inefficiency of environmental regimes [in this study institutions] arises from the 
difficulty of regulating independent political actors in the context of an anarchical international 
system.”  This indicates that the agency of non-state actors becomes more recognised within the 61
theory of neoliberal institutionalism. Actors like the EU has been a successful non-state participant 
within many international environmental agreements.  The argument that neoliberal 62
institutionalism ”contest the state-centric biases of realist explanations”  would strengthen the view 63
of international organisations as non-state actors. The concept of agency can therefore go further 
than states. This is however what makes this dimension problematic. Even though these actors are 
mentioned as important they are not fully accepted by the theory and the main actors discussed by 
the scholars continues to be states. 
 Keohane, Robert. O. (1990)., p. 73257
 Keohane, Robert. O & Nye, Joseph. (1987)., p. 72758
 Mitchell, Ronald. B (2003)., p. 4259
 Saryal, Rajnish (2015)., p. 560
 Saryal, Rajnish (2015)., p. 1761
 Saryal, Rajnish (2015)., p. 5 62
 Saryal, Rajnish (2015)., p. 563
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Following the above, the one-sided image of actors within institutions leaves non-states actors 
without sufficient recognition and the fact that these actors have the ability to influence institutions 
are only briefly discussed. Scholars mention the need for an inclusion of these actors or the need for 
more research but then continue discussing the issue from a state perspective. Agency is essential 
for this specific research since a transfer from EU ETS towards CORSIA would affect a number of 
different actors. The fact that the EU, based on the definition above, can be seen as both an 
international institution and an international organisation makes the agency dimension more 
complicated and more difficult to apply in this specific case, as will be seen in the analysis.  
Based on this, the dimension agency has been developed, which comprises of two parameters: 
states and non-state actors. This dimension will be used to search for key words and sentences that 
indicate what actors the Commission recognises and their perceived degree of agency within 
international relations in general and within emission reduction in particular.  
Dependence: Interdependence – independence  
To provide an understanding of the concept of interdependence, Keohane and Nye start from 
dependence, which they define as ”a state of being determined or significantly affected by external 
forces.”  Building upon this definition, interdependence is defined as mutual dependence. Within 64
the international system, Keohane and Nye explain, interdependence ”refers to situations 
characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries.”  In an 65
interdependent relationship between states, costs and benefits go both ways, which limits state 
autonomy. In an interdependent world, furthermore, staying independent is more costly than partly 
giving up state sovereignty.  Traditionally interdependence among states has been associated with 66
military power and security seeking. In a neoliberal institutionalist view, however, interdependence 
has more to do with the economic, social and environmental aspects of state relations.  When 67
mentioning military interdependence, neoliberal institutionalist scholars emphasise that this does 
not necessarily equal a zero-sum game. Instead, military alliances and cooperations are formed to 
create a secure environment for all participating states.   68
 Keohane, Robert. O & Nye, Joseph. (2001)., p. 7-964
 Keohane, Robert. O & Nye, Joseph. (2001)., p. 7-965
 Keohane, Robert. O. (1990)., p. 74266
 Keohane, Robert. O & Nye, Joseph. (1987)., p. 72767
 Keohane, Robert. O & Nye, Joseph. (2001)., p. 968
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Keohane and Nye also introduces the concept of complex interdependence, which they put forward 
as the ideal type of state relations. They define this as ”a situation among a number of countries in 
which multiple channels of contact connect society […]; there is no hierarchy of issues; and 
military force is not used by governments towards one another”.  What distinguish complex 69
interdependence from interdependence are the many actors and issues involved. 
In line with Keohane and Nye, it might be reasonable to suggest that climate issues are 
characterised by interdependence, or even complex interdependence, as these are issues that affect 
all states and that no state can solve on its own. As such, it could possibly be argued that 
cooperation is the best way to minimise costs resulting from climate change. This arguably makes 
dependency an important concept for this specific study, which will be further demonstrated in the 
analysis. 
By providing an arena for cooperation and information exchange, facilitating agreements and giving 
rise to state expectations, institutions have an impact on states interdependent relationships.  70
Within the frames of self-interests, states allow international institutions to influence their interests 
and capabilities. States relate to the rules and norms set by institution to protect their reputation 
within the international system.  State preferences may therefore change based on interdependence 71
since they are more likely to base their decisions on other states actions. If the level of 
interdependence increases, the need for coordinated policy will be more significant.  72
The function and the potential environmental benefits of institutions are clearly expressed from a 
neoliberal institutionalist perspective. The above discussion further shows the possible view of 
CORSIA as an international emission reduction institution, formed in order to better manage global 
aviation emissions. 
 Keohane, Robert. O & Nye, Joseph. (1987)., p. 73169
 Keohane, Robert O. (1982) ”The Demand for International Regimes” International Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2, International 70
Regimes, pp. 325-355., p. 334  
And 
Keohane, Robert. O & Nye, Joseph. (1987)., p. 728, 732
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This gives rise to the dimension of dependence, with its parameters of interdependence and 
independence. The dimension will be used to get an understanding of how the Commission 
considers state relation and global cooperation. 
Logic of choice: Rational choice – norm based choice 
The neoliberal institutionalist assumption according to which states are rational self-interested 
actors can be used to explain states’ motivation behind states participation in international 
institutions.  Keohane holds that ”state behaviour can only be understood in the context of 73
international institutions, which both constrain states and make their actions intelligible to others, 
and it denies that states consistently search for relative gains.”  Instead, states strive for absolute 74
gains and regard cooperation as a non-zero sum game, which results in a positive outcome for all 
actors involved.  It should be noted that states, being rational actors, would not engage in 75
cooperations without there being any possible gains and benefits.  This applies as much to states 76
with economic interests as to states with environmental interests.  77
As already mentioned, entering international institutions means giving up part of state sovereignty. 
It could be questioned why states are willing to make this commitment despite there being no 
guarantee that it will actually bring the desired benefits. Keohane explain this by referring to the so 
called norm for generalized commitment, which provides that if one state helps other states, it can 
count on help in the future.   78
To further explain the motives behind states’ participation in international institutions, Michell 
makes a distinction between two logics of action. Under the logic of consequences, Mitchell 
suggests, states act based on calculations of what actions will bring the most (material) benefits.  79
This is a ”self-conscious process”.  By rewarding or sanctioning certain actions, moreover, 80
institutions can influence state behavior.  This logic, which is consistent with neoliberal 81
institutionalist thinking, stands in contradiction to the logic of appropriateness. Under the logic of 
 Keohane, Robert. O. (1988)., p. 38173
 Keohane, Robert. O. (1990)., p. 73474
 Saryal, Rajnish (2015)., p. 3-475
 Keohane, Robert. O. (1988)., p. 38676
 Saryal, Rajnish (2015)., p. 477
 Keohane, Robert O. (1982)., p. 342-34378
 Mitchell, Ronald. B (2003)., p. 44-4579
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appropriateness, state behavior is not a function of interests, but of state identity. Mitchell holds 
that, in line with this logic, ”norms, identities and ideas play far more important roles than interests 
and power”.  This implies that states join international institutions because they identify 82
themselves with the norms and rules that constitute the institutions.  This logic is consistent with a 83
norm-based approach to state relations. Institutions influence states by providing an arena for 
cooperation consistent with the states identity or practice influence over states that join the 
institution for other reasons. As such, both logics can be used to explain how institutions can 
influence state behavior.  84
Building on the logic of consequences and the neoliberal institutionalist line of thought, Keohane 
suggests that, within international institutions, states’ ”[s]hort-run self-interest is affected by 
constraints imposed on policy choices by agreed-upon rules; long-run conceptions of self-interest 
may be reshaped as a result, in part, of practices engaged in over a period of time.”  In other words, 85
by putting constraints on states’ short-term interests, institutions influence states long-term interests. 
Even though Keohane build his argument on the neoliberal institutionalist line of thought, it might 
be reasonable to suggest that it also borrows from the logic of appropriateness. In making this 
argument, moreover, Keohane makes a distinction between short-term and long-term interests, but 
fails to further develop this distinction. There is reason to believe, however, that when states with 
interests of different temporal scope join the same institution, possible interest clashes may occur. 
With regard to this specific study, it may be reasonable to suggest that economic interests are often 
short-term, whereas environmental interests are more long-term. 
The above discussion of the possible logics behind state behavior can be linked to Aakre and Hovis 
study on why states participate in ETSs. Interest driven states, that is, states following the neoliberal 
institutionalist logic of consequences, are less inclined than norm driven states to enter international 
environmental institutions. Based on this reasoning, it might be reasonable to suggest that states 
working under the logic of consequences would be in favor of a transfer from the EU ETS to 
CORSIA if they believe that this would bring additional benefits. Under the logic of 
appropriateness, on the other hand, states would presumably support the transition towards 
CORSIA as this is consistent with their identity of environmentally friendly states.  
 Mitchell, Ronald. B (2003)., p. 3582
 Mitchell, Ronald. B (2003)., p. 4583
 Saryal, Rajnish (2015)., p. 884
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Building on this discussion, the dimension of logic of choice has been developed, which is made up 
of the parameters rational choice and norm-based choice. This dimension will be used to provide an 
understanding of the logic behind the Commission’s support for CORSIA. The following section 
will provide an explanation of how, more specifically, the three dimensions will be applied to the 
gathered material. 
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Research design and method 
To provide an explanation of why the Commission has chosen to support a transition from the EU 
ETS to CORSIA, this study will make use of the method of qualitative concept analysis. 
Considering its deductive nature, this method is suitable as it allows the theory, in this case 
neoliberal institutionalism, to determine the concepts, or dimensions, that are to guide the screening 
of the gathered material. A more inductive approach would be less effective, as it implies a more 
open and broader analysis of the data, where the texts determine what is being studied. In other 
words, rather than starting from observations of the studied material, this study has a theoretical 
starting point. By in this way applying neoliberal institutionalist theory on the gathered material, 
previous understandings of state behavior and institution formation will, in a first step, serve to 
explain and interpret the Commission’s actions. Following the examples of several scholars, the 
findings of this study will, in a second step, be used to reflect on the theory itself.  In this way, 86
qualitative concept analysis allows this study to contribute to developing the theory itself, in line 
with the second aim of this study. 
More specifically, the method of qualitative concept analysis is, for the purpose of this study, 
operationalised in several steps. First, the basic assumptions of the theoretical framework, that is, 
neoliberal institutionalism, are identified. From these basic assumptions, a number of systematised 
concepts are defined, which constitute the three dimensions that make up this study’s analytical 
instrument: : agency, dependence and logic of choice. In a next step, each dimension is divided into 
two parameters: states and non-state actors, interdependence and independence, and rational choice 
and norm-based choice. These parameters are used as a filter for the systematic screening of the 
empirical data. In other words, these parameters are used to collect keywords and sentences that fall 
within their scope and indicates the Commission’s motives. Lastly, in line with the second aim of 
this research, the findings will be put in relation to the basic assumptions of the theoretical 
framework, in an attempt to contribute to the development of this theory.  87
 Alvesson, Mats and Kärreman, Dan. (2013) The Use of Empirical Material for Theory Development In: Qualitative Research and 86
Theory Development: Mystery as Method. London., p. 8-9, 31-33 
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To further clarify how the dimensions developed for this study will be applied, a few examples can 
be provided. With regard to agency, this dimension will serve to detect keywords and sentences 
indicating how the Commission discusses and recognises actors within the context of the EU ETS 
and CORSIA. Examples of keywords are in this case states, governments, firms, companies, 
airlines, NGOs and other non-state actors. As for dependence, sentences indicating the 
Commission’s view of the issues at stake and its understanding of at what level of the international 
system these issues are better addressed. Possible keywords are global problem/solution, global 
environmental action, cross-border, cooperation, collaboration, individual/national/regional action 
and self-determination. The third and last dimension – the logic of choice – is used to identify text 
segments indicating the logics behind the Commission’s support for a transition towards CORSIA. 
Relevant keywords could be mutual/individual/common gains, benefits and interests; common 
norms and rules; as well as identity and self-understanding. 
An alternative analytical tool that could possibly have been used for this research is that of ideal 
types. Ideal types are used to categorise data in fixed boxes and thus make it possible to assess to 
what extent a studied phenomenon corresponds to an ideal type.  However, the use of dimensions 88
and parameters are preferred as they allow for a more nuanced and flexible analysis, as keywords 
are gathered based on how well they fit within the interpretation span of the dimensions.  89
In making use of qualitative concept analysis, moreover, this study contributes to the analytical 
generalisability of international cooperation research.  Becker maintains that it is possible to see 90
concepts as empirical generalisations, that can be developed and tested through empirical 
research.  However, this is not without implications. Becker underlines the problem that may arise 91
when the theoretical attributes of a concept are not sufficient to account for the empirical findings, 
which makes the concept less generalisable. In order for the researcher to be able to analyse these 
findings, the attributes of the concept need to be refined.  This may result in the development of 92
existing theories. With regard to this specific study, there is reason to believe that the neoliberal 
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institutionalist one-sided focus on states and the neglect of the temporal aspect of state interests, as 
identified in the theory section, are attributes that may possibly give rise to this sort of problem.  
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Material 
Against the background of the method chapter, this chapter will introduce the empirical material 
that will be used to provide an understanding of why the Commission has decided to support a 
transition from the EU ETS towards CORSIA. This material serves as the empirical starting point 
for the analysis. The chapter will also present how the material has been collected. 
It was towards the end of 2016, in connection with the adoption of the ICAO Resolution A39-3, that 
the debate on a possible transition from the EU ETS towards CORSIA gained momentum. This is 
why the collection of material has been limited to the period late 2016 to 2019. This is a reasonable 
limitation considering the scope of this study. Even if the ambition has been to cover all the 
available material on the topic from this period, it is possible that some material has been left out 
unintentionally. It should be noted, furthermore, that the development of CORSIA is an ongoing 
process and that new materials may have been published during the time of writing. 
In the search for material, the following primary keywords have been used: EU emission trading 
scheme, global emission trading, EU ETS and CORSIA. These keywords have been used in 
combination with a number of subordinated keywords, including aviation, marked based measures, 
Commission, debate, directive, regulation and legislation. Also snowball sampling has proved 
useful in the collection of material. Whereas some materials derive directly from the Commission’s 
debate on the EU ETS in relation to CORSIA, other materials treat the general emission reduction 
policy. Following the presented search criteria and in consideration of validity, documents used in 
this research have been gathered only from its source of origin. Where several versions of a text are 
available, only the final versions have been collected.  93
Of the materials that directly focus on the EU ETS in relation to CORSIA, three pieces of material 
deserve particular attention. The first is a debate in the European Parliament on the EU ETS and 
preparations for the implementation of a global market-based measure, attended by climate action 
and energy Commissioner Miguel Arias Cañete.  The second is a hearing in the European 94
Parliament on the development of CORSIA, attended by transport Commissioner Violeta Bulc.  95
 Silverman, David. (2014) Interpreting Qualitative Data. London: Sage., p. 90-91 93
 Debate in the European Parliament 11-09-2017. Item number three on the agenda: EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS): 94
continuing current limitations of scope for aviation activities and preparing to implement a global market-based measure from 2021 
 ENVI committee meeting in the European Parliament 19-11-2018. Item number two on the agenda: Exchange of views with Ms 95
Violeta Bulc, Commissioner for Transport, on ICAO's CORSIA developments
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The role of the Commissioners is to represent the Commission and the EU more broadly. As such, 
what the Commissioners express in debates and hearings arguably says something about the 
Commission’s views and motivations. Therefore, the two events are of particular importance for 
this study. The two events are also the best alternative to an interview with the Commission, which 
is difficult to get. They are also examples of situations where the Commissioners are put under 
pressure and are forced to respond to questions before both Members of the European Parliament 
(MEPs) and the public, making them potentially more likely to unintentionally express motives for 
actions than written communication from the Commission. The third is an impact assessment on the 
implementation of the global market based measures for aviation emissions.  This text expresses 96
the Commission’s views of potential advantages and disadvantages of a transition from the EU ETS 
towards CORSIA. 
The debate with Commissioner Cañete has already been transcribed by the European Parliament. 
The hearing with Commissioner Bulc, however, is only publicly available in the form of a video 
recording and therefore had to be transcribed for the purpose of this research.  The transcription of 97
the hearing is made to make sure that all the empirical material used for this study is more accessed 
and analysed. This also increases the reliability of the analysis.  98
In addition to the three pieces of material introduced above, two pieces of legislation, one 
regulation, which amends the EU ETS directive  to prepare for the implementation of a global 99
market based measure from 2021,  and one delegated regulation on the implementation of ICAOs 100
MRV-standards, which supplements the EU ETS directive,  have been analysed. This data serve to 101
provide the legislative basis of the study.   
 Impact Assessment - Of the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2003/87/96
EC establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community in view of the implementation of a 
single global market-based measure to international aviation emissions.
 The transcribed document can be found in the appendix to this study.97
 Silverman, David. (2014)., p. 87-88 98
 The EU ETS directive referes to ”Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 99
establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/
EC”.
 Regulation (EU) 2017/2392 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2017 amending Directive 2003/87/EC 100
to continue current limitations of scope for aviation activities and to prepare to implement a global market-based measure from 2021.
 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) .../... of 6.3.2019 supplementing Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and 101
of the Council as regards measures adopted by the International Civil Aviation Organisation for the monitoring, reporting and 
verification of aviation emissions for the purpose of implementing a global market-based measure. 
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The materials that treats the broader emission reduction policy includes one communication on the 
Commission’s long-term climate vision,  and one in-depth analysis that supports this 102
communication.  These two pieces of material express the Commission’s general vision of global 103
cooperation and emission reduction efforts. 
Even if the written material do not leave the same room for opinions as the two events in the 
European parliament, they are considered as an expression in text of the Commission's motives and 
incentives for supporting a transition towards CORSIA. Secondary material is also used to support 
the argument put forward in this study. Example of such material is the Paris agreement  and the 104
ICAO Resolution A39-3 . 105
From this backdrop, the analysis is divided into three sub chapters, one for each dimension. Key 
words and sentences in the analysed material are sorted into one of the relevant dimensions, agency, 
dependence and logic of choice and discussed in one of the three sub chapters. The chapter will 
follow by a concluding discussion.  
 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The European council, the Council, the European Economic 102
and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European Investment Bank - A Clean Planet for all - A European 
strategic long-term vision for a prosperous, modern, competitive and climate neutral economy.
 In-Depth Analysis in Support of the Commission Communication COM(2018) 773. A Clean Planet for all A European long-term 103
strategic vision for a prosperous, modern, competitive and climate neutral economy. 
 United Nations (2015). The Paris Agreement, 21st Conference of the Parties, Paris: United Nations.104
 ICAO Resolution A39-3. (2016) Consolidated statement of continuing ICAO policies and practices related to environmental 105
protection – Global Market-based Measure (MBM) scheme., p. 1 
!31
Analysis  
The following chapter will analyse the empirical material with a view to answer the research 
question how can neoliberal institutionalism explain why the European Commission, despite the 
identified risks, is in favour of a transition from the EU ETS towards CORSIA? The chapter is 
divided into three subsections, one for each of the three dimension. As mentioned above, the 
dimensions are innately interrelated, which makes a certain overlap between the three sections 
unavoidable. 
Agency 
The first dimension to be accounted for is that of agency. Starting from the Commission’s 
Regulation, reads that ”key features of the global market-based measure have yet to be developed 
and that its implementation depends on domestic legislation laid down by participating States and 
regions”.  In this piece of legislation, the Commission specifically recognises states and regions as 106
important actors in the developing process of CORSIA. With regard to emission reduction in 
general, the Commission’s Communication further outlines the aim to ”inspire as well as enable 
stakeholders, researchers, entrepreneurs and citizens alike to develop new and innovative industries, 
businesses and associated jobs.”  This quote shows the Commission’s ambition to extend the 107
scope of agency to a broader inclusion of non-state actors.  
The desired contribution of both states and non-state actors within the field of emission reduction 
have been outlined by the Commission. With regard to the national level, the Commission’s In-
depth analysis concludes that the member states have a key role in developing policies for an 
effective transition to a low-carbon future. Many member states have already agreed to work 
towards the target of net zero emissions by 2050 at the latest and have submitted national long-term 
strategies for this purpose.  The member states are, based on the set EU emission reduction 108
targets, expected to develop policy and be aware of the long-term aspect of these targets. As for the 
local level, local authorities contribution to emission reduction has increased since a large part of 
the European citizens today lives in cities. As put forward in the studied In-depth analysis, local 
governments are of particular importance in developing, implementing and enforcing climate 
policies for emission reduction. Cross-border cooperation is further underlined as an effective tool 
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for promotion of solutions and to address climate challenges, something European cities have 
successfully demonstrate by various networks and cooperations. To contribute to emission reduction 
even further, the Commission also recommends and try to influence these local actors to develop 
long-term strategies.  The Commission further outlines the roles of businesses and the civil 109
society. With regard to businesses, the Commission wants the private sector to further contribute to 
emission reduction.  Airlines are put forward as important actors for the EU emission reduction 110
commitments and the aviation sector has also agreed to take on long term objectives, making it the 
first of its kind to commit to a long-term plan for climate action.  By 2050 the aviation sector is 111
committed to reduce net emissions by 50 percent compared to 2005 levels.  The Commission also 112
considers public consultations as an important instrument, to strengthen the link to the business 
community and to collect useful insight in the work on carbon reduction, in order to get different 
stakeholders views on long-term GHG emission reduction.  113
As for individuals, the Commission suggests that the civil society should work to create awareness 
of long-term measures for decarbonisation and contribute to the creation of norms to influence 
citizens lifestyles.  In the material the Commission maintains that ”[s]trong public participation 114
and ownership will not only help accelerate the implementation of current commitments in the EU, 
but can also help strengthen global efforts in the short, medium and long-term.”  Emission 115
reduction efforts on an individual level can therefore contribute to better global measures. This is 
further strengthened by fact that the ”[c]ivil society organisations have already come forward to 
support countries, local governments and businesses to come up with and understand long-term 
plans, even beyond 2050.”  This quotation underscores the Commission’s wish for actors within 116
all sectors of the society to contribute to emission reduction by the EU set long-term goals. The 
above not only further confirms the Commission’s broad view of agency, it also outlines what the 
Commission expect from these actors. 
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Based on the above findings, it seems reasonable to suggest that the Commission recognises several 
actors of importance for emission reduction. The Commission pushes these actors to develop long-
term strategies and work in accordance with the EU’s long-term environmental targets for emission 
reduction. These non-state actors, mentioned by the theory but not recognised in the same degree as 
in the studied material, cannot themselves enter international institutions but are however still 
expected to apply and abide by the agreements. Perhaps the most complex from a temporal 
perspective is that of individuals and civil society. It is reasonable to believe that there are major 
temporal differences between individual’s ”long-term planning” and the Commission’s preferred 
long-term approach with goals for 2050. This factor is something that is not foreseen by the 
neoliberal institutionalist framework which opens for a completely new type of temporality. 
The Commission’s Regulation further reads that ”[s]ince the objectives of this Regulation, namely 
to extend the current limitations of scope for aviation activities until 31 December 2023 and to 
prepare to implement a global market-based measure from 2021, cannot be sufficiently achieved by 
the Member States but can rather, by reason of its scale or effects, be better achieved at Union 
level.”  This tells something about the Commission’s understanding of the EU’s role in emission 117
reduction, which relates to the above mentioned complexity of the EU’s dual identity as both an 
international institution and an international organisation. The statement in the material goes in line 
with the EU as an institutional actor providing an arena for the development of common standards 
and regulations for emission trading in line with the global scheme. The Commission’s delegated 
regulation, on the other hand, provides that ”[t]he Union is amongst the first jurisdictions to adopt 
legally binding legislative provisions for the purposes of implementing ICAO's scheme […], while 
other States are also expected to undertake such domestic implementation.”  This suggests the 118
EU’s desire and willingness to be a leading actor in global emission reduction, which relates to its 
identity as an international organisation. This is also expressed in the Communication, where the 
Commission maintains the EU’s aim to remain a leading multilateral actor and together with 
international partners work with ICAO to promote the work of decarbonisation.  International 119
partners are in this case other states, suggesting the Commission’s consideration of the EU as an 
state-actor and further strengthening the EU’s organisational identity within the international 
community. 
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The above statements seem to suggest that the EU have different roles – a dual identity – when it 
comes to the development of CORSIA. The EU can be seen as both an international organisation, 
participating within the institution of CORSIA, as well as an institution, promoting different norms 
for its member states. Both roles suggest the Commission’s view of the EU as an important actor in 
the context of global emission reduction. 
To sum up this section, it could be argued that, in line with the neoliberal institutionalist framework, 
states are considered to play an important role in emission reduction and the development of 
CORSIA. The EU’s twofold identity, in line with the above definition of both international 
institutions and international orgnisations, makes its agency difficult to apply.  
However, the empirical material also shows the Commission’s focus on a broad spectrum of actors 
of importance for emission reduction who are expected to contribute to the EU’s long-term emission 
reduction targets. This approach differs from the neoliberal institutionalist line of thought, which 
only consider states to be of importance within institutions. Non-state actors are neglected even 
though they still are affected by states international commitments. The recognition of different non-
state actors from various levels of the society moreover opens up for new temporal aspects not 
taken under consideration by the theory.   
The fact that the EU actually recognises various actors of importance for institutions not only 
strengthen the argument of the narrowed focus of neoliberal institutionalism, it also provides an 
example of institutional impact on actors within institutions. 
Dependence  
With regards to the second dimension dependence, the Commission suggest in its In-depth analysis 
that: 
”[w]orking together, learning from each other and scaling up successful approaches, are essential. Targeted 
programs or platforms for different sectors are good practice for enabling and creating relevant knowledge 
and organisational capacity. Strengthening these platforms, promoting the cooperation between stakeholders 
and the sharing of experiences are crucial to accelerate and scale up climate action.”   120
 In-Depth Analysis (2018)., p. 291120
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This paragraph goes hand in hand with the neoliberal institutionalist assumption of institutions 
discussed above (how they are considered as ”persistent and connected sets of rules (formal or 
informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations.” ). The 121
statement show the Commission’s view of international cooperation as an effective arena to manage 
global climate action. It is further suggested in the empirical material that international cooperation 
is needed to create ”a positive momentum to enhance global climate ambition; share knowledge and 
experience in developing long-term strategies and implementing efficient policies” . This show 122
the Commission’s perception of international institutions and cooperation as important to facilitate 
the development of common policies and information exchange. 
When CORSIA was discussed in the European Parliament, Cañete argued that ”[o]n the one hand, 
we need to facilitate international developments and get ready to implement CORSIA. On the other 
hand, we will have to discuss the future rules for the European Union ETS in a context where 
CORSIA becomes a reality.”  This paragraph tells that CORSIA is considered a better option 123
compared to the regional EU ETS. The Commission support CORSIA and the EU ETS could 
possible be sacrificed. During the debate Cañete however underlined that CORSIA’s offsetting 
instrument is not the preferred instrument by the Commission. The Commission rather wanted a 
global emission-trading-scheme, but an offsetting mechanism was the only instrument the 
international community could agree upon.  Cañete moreover argued that if the EU would not be 124
satisfied with the results of the developed global scheme, or if other countries not fulfill their 
commitments, the EU could decide to go back to their own scheme and address global emissions on 
their own.  This say something about how the Commission consider global cooperation. Even 125
though ICAO’s targets are less ambitious than the EU’s, the Commission is still considering 
CORSIA as the preferred scheme for emission reduction. This reasoning strengthen the argument 
that a transition to CORSIA is done in line with the belief of the interdependent nature of aviation 
emissions. Emission reduction is a global problem and it would be more effective to address it on a 
global level.  
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CORSIA and its anticipated environmental contribution was also discussed in the European 
Parliament by transport commissioner Violeta Bulc.  Bulc pointed out that even though the EU 126
ETS is seen as a scheme with higher ambitions than CORSIA and that many uncertainties still 
remain, concerning the effectiveness of the scheme, the EU ETS can not by itself address global 
aviation emissions in a sufficient and effective manner.  The Commissioner further said that  127
”in 2021 to 2035 EU ETS will sort of cover 956 empty CO2 emissions. When if we take a look at the 
CORSIA that in the similar period, in the same period, will represent 2711 empty [CO2 emissions]. So for me, 
this is a huge motivation in order to get CORSIA onboard. And, I understand in a way frustration because we 
believe we have a better system than that the world wants to commit to. But the pollution does not know the 
boarders, and for me it is a huge motivation to get the world behind the commitments in order to get the 
global effect going.”   128
This quotation clearly state the Commission’s view of global commitments. Even though CORSIA 
has no finalised rules or targets and the fact that the EU ETS is considered to be a stronger scheme 
from an environmental point of view, a broader scheme with its potential to be an effective arena 
due its global nature is considered as a necessary measure.  
The Commission further states in its Long term strategy that there is a need to ”[a]nticipate and 
prepare for geopolitical shifts, including migratory pressure, and strengthen bilateral and 
multilateral partnerships, for instance by providing support to third countries in defining low- 
carbon resilient development through climate mainstreaming and investments.”  This show the 129
issues complex interrelatedness, and helping others overcome obstacles will in the long run 
contribute to a better climate.  This statement therefore say something about the Commission’s 130
understanding of the issue’s scope, how emissions cannot be sufficiently reduced without taking 
other global issues into consideration and how it contributes to the complex interdependent 
relationship between countries.   
The Commission’s Impact assessment further stresses that if the EU choose to introduce the full 
scope of the EU ETS instead of or during the development of CORSIA, this would result in 
widespread dissatisfaction from countries outside of the EEA. Such an action could be interpreted 
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as a statement of reluctance of the development of a global market based mechanism for aviation 
emissions by the international community.  Also Commissioner Cañete underlined this issue, 131
where he said that an introduction of the full scope of the EU ETS would possible result in 
dissatisfaction from, and jeopardising the relationship with non-EU countries.  This material 132
shows the Commission’s interest in maintaining its international reputation and how state relations 
are important.  
In line with this, the issue of whether or not to file differences to ICAO towards CORSIA was 
touched upon by Commissioner Bulc. Many MEPs were reluctant to not filing differences to 
towards CORSIA, as the absence of such action would possibly lead to the disclosure of the EU’s 
emission reduction approach from a final ICAO agreement. The MEPs even advocated for the 
Commission to file reservations (which could be seen as a stronger contradiction) towards 
CORSIA.  Commissioner Bulc’s answer to this critique was although very straight forward. She 133
said that ”I am agains filing the reservation, I am for stating the differences very clearly on ICAO 
level and making sure that they understand under which conditions we are entering this deal. But if 
EU shows weaknesses, if EU is not leading the way, then it is quite likely that this will not 
happen.”  This discussion show how the Commission is worried about CORSIAs survival if the 134
EU is too aggressive in its demands. A possible reason for this could be the view of global 
cooperation as more important in itself, rather than the environmental standards. Bulc however said 
that the Commission still works to safeguard the EU ETS. ”Instead of reservation we focused on 
differences, and point out these differences and then of course bring them together, this our 
intention, to bring together ETS and CORSIA. I also like to say that whatever we agree will not go 
into force before 2020. That gives us enough time that we do a thorough impact assessment analysis 
of the full scheme.”  From the empirical material it seems like the Commission wants to be a 135
leading actor and negotiate aggressively by filing its dissatisfaction with the scheme, with the 
possible result of stronger environmental standards. At the same time this discussion shows how the 
EU’s global reputation and relations with other states is regarded as more important. This tell 
something about the Commission’s priorities. Global cooperation is potentially worth more than the 
EU’s desired environmental standards. However, the last sentence further show how the 
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Commission constantly point to possible emergency exits, if the scenario changes and the global 
scheme no longer can be seen as a suitable option. 
To conclude this section, CORSIA constitutes a global arena which is supposed to facilitate 
emission reduction within the aviation sector. CORSIA could therefore be considered an 
international institution for global emission reduction. In line with the neoliberal institutionalist 
framework it has been shown how the Commission in various ways consider cooperation as an 
effective instrument to handle climate change. Supporting CORSIA would mean that the EU is 
loosing its freedom, its independence, to decide over its emission reduction policy. The fact that the 
Commission is reluctant to negotiate too aggressively may moreover also be considered as an effect 
of influences from the institutional level on its participating actors. Actors interests change based on 
interdependence and the EU bases its actions on other actors actions. 
As the European Parliament is the only directly elected body of the EU institutions, the MEPs 
concerns of whether to file differences or not can be interpreted as a situation where the individual 
level of agency engage in the negotiation. The strong uncertainty towards CORSIA may derive 
from the temporal gap between the EU and the individual level. The Commission has experience of, 
and are forced to plan decades in advance, where potential future benefits of entering CORSIA 
would justify the Commission’s support of the scheme. The potential direct environmental loss that 
comes from a transfer to a weaker scheme than the EU ETS may, however, for the individual level 
be more difficult to grasp.  
Logic of choice  
With regard to the third dimension logic of choice, actors are driven by various interests and norms. 
As highlighted above by Aakre and Hovi, states join institutions based on different motives. 
Interest-driven states are more reluctant to join voluntary international institutions if other interests 
are threatened. As already mentioned, 71 states have announced their participation in the first 
voluntary phase of CORSIA. It should however be noted that countries outside of the EU have 
already opted out from the agreement. Important states like China, USA and Russia have moreover 
announced that they will join first in the second phase of the scheme.  At the hearing in the 136
European Parliament, Bulc briefly mentioned that states appear to be reluctant to join CORSIA 
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from a sovereignty point of view, as well as fear of falling behind in the development of their 
aviation industry.  Drawing on this, some states seems to be reluctant to join CORSIA based on 137
short-term economic interests. Based on the fact that CORSIA is a voluntary scheme and it is 
impossible for the global community to force member states to join. There is no guarantee that 
states who have promised to join in a later phase actually will fulfill their promise. It is reasonable 
to believe that the scheme would risk to fall apart if important states like China, USA and Russia 
would chose to abstain from participation. 
Airlines for its part, has also showed interest in the scheme. The International Air Transport 
Association, IATA, maintain that ”[t]he implementation of CORSIA will avoid the need for existing 
and new carbon pricing measures to be applied to international aviation emissions of a regional or 
national basis.”  By the use of a global uniform scheme the costly process of bringing different 138
schemes together and to make them co-exist will be eliminated.  CORSIA brings manageable 139
costs for actors within the aviation sector ”especially when compared with the costs that would 
result from multiple national or regional schemes, which would generate divergent compliance 
requirements for individual operators and therefore also increase the risk of market distortions.”  140
CORSIA is therefore considered as an effective scheme in order to avoid the costly patchwork of 
different carbon reduction instruments.  141
With regards to the EU, its motives to join CORSIA can be found in the Commission’s Impact 
assessment, holding that the EU must ensure a transition to CORSIA that contribute to emission 
reduction to its maximum, at the same time as the EU environmental targets are reached.  At the 142
Parliamentary hearing, Bulc further expressed that ”[o]ur objectives is simple, to reduce Co2 
emissions from aviation. That is no doubt about that. Together our job is twofold, to obtain the most 
ambitious deal possible within ICAO with the widest possible international coverage while not 
jeopardising the EU ETS for aviation.”  This together with Bulc’s above presented data (”in 2021 143
to 2035 EU ETS will sort of cover 956 empty CO2 emissions. When if we take a look at the 
CORSIA that in the similar period, in the same period, will represent 2711 empty [CO2 
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emissions].” ), show how the Commission view CORSIA’s potential environmental effectiveness, 144
which could be considered as a motive for a transition.  
This however contradicts with the Commission’s own statements in its Impact assessment, saying 
that the global scheme ”is unlikely to result in a significant in-sector reduction of GHG emissions in 
the period up to 2035, which is insufficient under the Paris Agreement”.  It further states that the 145
initial phase of CORSIA would create a 20 percent gap of emission growth that will not be offset.  146
These two statements not only recognises the Commission’s awareness of the weaker environmental 
scope of CORSIA, it also underline that it to this point is impossible to predict to what extent the 
aviation sector will contribute to EU’s environmental goals within CORSIA.  Drawing on this, it 147
might be complicated for the EU to reach its set environmental goals if a transfer to CORSIA 
besoms reality. It also indicates that the environmental benefits might not be the Commission’s 
main interest for a transition to CORSIA. It is possible that the Commission consider CORSIA as 
something more than a global scheme for emission reduction.  
The fact that CORSIA is a scheme that build on offset credits could also strengthen this argument, 
since these credits will not contribute to the NDCs. Offset credits from international projects are 
today valid credits within the EU ETS. However, it is still not clear if this will be the case after 
2020.  Even if the Commission would propose a continued allowance of these international credits 148
within the EU ETS, the EU has committed to reach member states NDC’s without the use of 
international credits.  This leads to a situation where the EU’s future emission reduction efforts 149
within CORSIA would not contribute to the set NDC's, resulting in difficulties for the member 
states to achieve their environmental targets. 
This leads to the suspicion that other interests form the basis of the Commission’s support of 
CORSIA. Various other potential motives are identified in the empirical material. In its Impact 
assessment, the Commission states that during both the preparatory period of CORSIA (2017-2020) 
and the post 2020 period, the EU works to ”[m]aintain the competitiveness level in the aviation 
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sector and the level playing field in the internal market for aviation”.  This statement recognises 150
that the Commission sees both economic and competitive interests in a transition towards CORSIA. 
The Commission also holds that during a transition to CORSIA, the aim is to ensure that the 
environmental targets are reached without the EU economy taking any damage and for the 
relationship with ICAO to be as good as possible.  This statement says something about the 151
Commissions view of economic interests as superior environmental interests.  
The Commission’s competitive interest is further addressed in the Impact assessment, pushing for 
early preparations of the global scheme in order for the aviation industry, the member states and 
other actors to be well prepared when the scheme is supposed to enter into force in 2021.  In its 152
Delegated regulation, the Commission maintains the importance of equal treatment of the actors 
within the aviation sector, on all routes both within and outside of the EEA.  This show how the 153
support of CORSIA partly may be based on the Commission’s fear of competitive disadvantages if 
the EU is isolated from the world.  
The Delegated regulation further shows the Commission’s view of economic benefits superior its 
environmental interests, by saying that ”[i]t is in the self-interest of aircraft operators to report their 
emissions data for international flights in 2019 and 2020 as it will reduce the emissions they will 
have to offset later.”  If airlines fail to report their emissions during this period, ”the SARP 154
foresees using other information source to fill gaps”.  These two statements show how the 155
Commission priorities the European aviation sectors short term economic interests (which in a way 
can be seen as its own economic interests) over its environmental interests. A higher quota for 
offsetting of emissions would, in the future, result in the offsetting of more emissions. Now the 
Commission helps the aviation sector to avoid its commitments under CORSIA. 
The above discussion has shown the Commission’s environmental and economic motives to support 
CORSIA. One option discussed by the Commission, in order to ”obtain the most ambitious deal 
possible within ICAO with the widest possible international coverage” , at the same time as ”not 156
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jeopardising the EU ETS for aviation” , could possibly be to allow a parallel use of the two 157
schemes. Bulc expressed the Commission’s intention to participate in CORSIA and keep the 
aviation sector within the EU ETS during the hearing in the Parliament. She said that ”I am 
personally convinced we can find ways to combine CORSIA and the EU ETS in a way that is 
consistent with EU commitments under the Paris agreement and does not jeopardise ICAO:s efforts 
in favor of a global solutions.”  This show the Commission’s attempt to merge its rational 158
perception of potential future economic benefits of global cooperation with its identity of an 
organisation with far-reaching environmental roots. 
However, the following two paragraphs which can be found in ICAO Resolution A39-3, speaks 
against this reasoning:  
Noting the support of the aviation industry for a single global carbon offsetting scheme, as opposed to a 
patchwork of State and regional MBMs, as a cost effective measure to complement a broader package of 
measures including technology, operations and infrastructure measures;    159
And 
Recognizing that MBMs should not be duplicative and international aviation CO2 emissions should be 
accounted for only once;  160
Even though a parallel use of the two schemes could be seen as beneficial, a combination of the 
schemes might not be as simple as Commissioner Bulc expresses at the hearing. By supporting 
CORSIA, based on these two paragraphs, it is possible that the aviation sector would need to be 
phased out from the EU ETS.  As mentioned above, previous research also points to the negative 161
effects of a parallel use of two or more emission reduction scheme. Without sufficient rules airlines 
within the EU ETS would be encourage to buy allowances or to use offset credits from the lowest 
selling actor on the market, which today seems to be ICAO. Even if it would be possible to combine 
the two schemes, the parallel use of EU ETS and CORSIA would therefore also be ineffective from 
an environmental perspective as the prices on allowances would fall and it would be cheaper for 
airlines to mitigate. If sufficient rules would be in place, however, the EU would most likely have to 
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lower its prices on allowances to be able to satisfy the preferences of other participating states, also 
this leading to a lower price on allowances. 
In conclusion, various actors have different motives in joining institutions. In line with the 
theoretical framework, states and airlines have showed to act according to its rationality. This also 
applies to the EU. Based on the empirical material, it has however been possible to identify 
different interests that can be the basis for the Commission's support for the global scheme. Once 
again, the temporal aspect is shown in the EU’s long-term environmental interest and its short-term 
economic focus.  
From an environmental point of view, the Commission arguing for the importance of global 
cooperation in order to combat environmental hazards. Much however point to the fact that 
CORSIA will consist of substantially weaker targets than those of the existing EU ETS, which, 
together with statements in the empirical material, suggest that environmental result of the scheme 
is not the Commission’s main reason for a transfer. The fact that the EU informs the aviation sector 
on how it best avoids offsetting clearly shows the rationality in the Commission’s way of acting. 
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Concluding discussion 
This chapter will discuss the main findings of the empirical analysis in order to explicitly address 
the research question how can neoliberal institutionalism explain why the European Commission, 
despite the identified risks, is in favour of a transition from the EU ETS towards CORSIA? 
By applying a neoliberal institutionalist framework on the empirical material, several links between 
the theory and the studied case have been identified. With regard to the first dimension agency, it 
has been noted that the development of CORSIA brings together different types of actors that are all 
considered to play important roles when it comes to emission reduction. The national and regional 
level are highlighted as important for the direct development of CORSA, at the same time as local 
actors, companies and civil society are expected to contribute to emission reduction in general. 
Even if it is only states that can enter international institutions, the Commission expects these non-
state actors to contribute to emission reduction according to the EU’s set long-term commitments. 
These identified actors, however, have different interests in participating in institutions, interests 
that are of various temporal perspectives. Something that is not recognised by the theory. 
The Commission also sees the EU as a global actor with a prominent role in the context of the 
development of CORSIA. This recognition of various different non-state actors however is 
inconsistent with the neoliberal institutionalist assumption according to which states are the only 
important actors within international institutions. The theory does admit the existence of non-state 
actors, but not sufficiently recognises there agency within institutions. This is also something that 
has been underlined by Saryal, who calls for the development of how neoliberal institutionalism 
treats agency.  
As for the dimension of dependence, the empirical material show direct similarities between the 
neoliberal institutionalist definition of institutions and how the Commission regards international 
cooperation and expected benefits resulting from these. The coordination of global emission 
reduction measures affect several policy fields, making the relationship to other states important and 
shows the complex and multi-faceted nature of emission reduction. In turn, this helps explain the 
Commission’s motives and drive for international cooperation. It might even be possible to argue 
that this example is compatible with Keohane and Nyes concept of complex interdependence.  
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It goes without arguing that emissions are a cross-border threat that affects all countries in the 
world. To meet this threat, the Commission expresses the potential environmental benefits that 
comes with cooperation, as well as the assumed costs for the EU of staying outside of CORSIA. In 
line with this discussion, by giving up the freedom to regulate aviation emissions, countries can 
come together to work for a better environment and take part of the benefits that may come out of 
cooperation. 
As regards the logic of choice, it is shown in the empirical material that different actors are driven 
by different motives to enter international institutions or stay independent. States seems to, in line 
with previous research, be driven by both interests or norms. The short-term economic interest of 
non-state actors can be further related to actors’ rationality within the neoliberal institutional line of 
thought. Not only is there from a temporal point of view a clash between different actors interests, 
The EU’s short-term economic benefits may also clash with its more long-term environmental 
interests. It is therefore reasonable to believe that the Commission is motivated by both norms from 
its identity as a global environmental actor, and as an actor with strong economic interests. The 
analysed material, however, shows that supporting CORSIA would generate short-term economic 
and competitive gains for the EU. Based on the paradoxical nature of the issue, where the EU’s 
substantial environmental commitments to the Paris agreement would be difficult to reach based on 
the today insufficient ICAO regulation, a transfer towards CORSIA would possibly be motivated by 
economic and competitive interests. 
As shown, the neoliberal institutionalist assumptions can, to a certain extent, provide an 
understanding of the Commission’s support for a transfer from the EU ETS towards CORSIA and 
therefore also meets the first aim of this study. However, the two factors actors and time have been 
identified as neglected in the theoretical framework. As for the factor of actors, it could possibly be 
argued that there is a need for additional recognition of the importance of non-state actors within 
institutions. From this follows the need for a refinement of the agency concept within the theoretical 
framework of neoliberal institutionalism. There is not necessarily a need for the theoretical 
framework to treat all the different actors as equal, since it is only states that can enter into global 
agreements (an airline or an individual cannot, for example, apply for a membership in CORSIA). 
Instead, as this study shows, the Commission’s support for CORSIA seems to be motivated by its 
economic interests, which in this case is closely interrelated with airlines economic interests (non-
state actors affected by the Commissions decision whether or not to join CORSIA). The refinement 
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of the agency concept should therefore put greater emphasis on the role of these non-state actors 
and their interests within institutions. 
When it comes to the temporal aspect of actors’ interests, it has been shown that the Commission 
pursues a policy where it wants these different identified actors to take on long-terms commitments. 
The fact that the Commission pushes more short-term non-state focused actors to work in 
accordance with the EU’s preferred long-term operation can be seen as a paradox, as these non-state 
actors can not by themselves enter into international agreements. The research also indicates the 
temporal factor of the EU’s dual interests, making it strive for both short-term and long-term 
interests. 
This discussion leads to the second aim of this research, the possible contribution to the further 
development of neoliberal institutionalism. The research has thus showed that; (a) more actors than 
states are of importance for the formation of institutions and; (b) the problem of clashing interests is 
complicated and the temporal aspects of different actors interests need to be taken into account. In 
an effort to contribute to the development of neoliberal institutionalism and to make the theory 
better fit for this study, the above developed analytical framework have been complemented with 
the two factors not sufficiently accounted for by the mainstream neoliberal institutionalist scholars. 
The following figure shows the potential development of the theoretical framework and the 
contribution of this study to neoliberal institutionalism. 
Figure 2: Refined analytical framework. 
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Even if there is a neglect of non-state actors within the agency dimension, any modification of the 
dimension is not considered necessary. Considering that only states can enter into agreements of 
this kind, the parameters states and non-state actors, working as two opposites, are still considered 
accurate. However, since non-state actors have been shown to play an important role within 
international institutions, the role of these actors need to be put forward to a greater extent within 
the theoretical framework. This is why non-state actors have been added as a sub-parameter to 
states. 
With regard to the temporal aspect, the factor time has also been added to the analytical framework 
as a vertical parameter. The temporal aspect is present in all three dimensions and it is therefore 
suitable to place it vertically in the analytical framework. 
Neoliberal institutionalist assumptions about mutual interests and interdependence can contribute to 
the understanding of why the Commission has decided to support a transition from the EU ETS 
towards CORSIA. The above discussion has provided an understanding of actors’ belief that 
cooperation can result in mutual benefits and hence also of actors’ motives for entering or forming 
international institutions. By refining the concept of actors and adding the factor of time to the 
analytical framework, this brings further light into the Commission’s actions. These refined 
analytical framework provide a better understanding of the logics behind the formation of 
international environmental institutions, which is the overall purpose of this study. The use of a 
neoliberal institutionalist framework without the suggested adjustments provides a weaker 
explanation of the Commission’s action. More research is, however, needed to further establish the 
role of non-state actors within international institutions and to determine to what extent the two 
schemes contribute to emission reduction. This is an avenue for future research. 
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Appendix               
ENVI committee meeting in the European Parliament 
Exchange of views with Ms Violeta Bulc, Commissioner for Transport, on ICAO's CORSIA 
developments 
Violeta Bulc 
Respected members of the European Parliament. It is my honor and pleasure to adress you again in 
this house. Decarbonisation of aviation is certainly a top priority for the Juncker commission since 
the day one and I do expect that it will remain that way on the political agenda, not only for this 
Commission but for decades to come. The Commission is firmly committed to the goals of the Paris 
agreement. 
To achieve them we are making an irreversible shift to low and ultimately no emission mobility 
with a very clear vision zero by 2050. This is also the topic of the EU long time strategy for green 
house gas emission reduction, which the Commission will adopt at the end of November. Our 
strategy will go beyond transport and address the EU economy as a whole. So the question is no 
longer whether but more how? Now turning to aviation, it is both a sector for the European Union 
economy and an essential means of transport. The growth of aviation is also providing the EU with 
a consistently growing pool of jobs and helping regional development by attracting activity and 
investments. But growth for the sake of growth can not be an objective in its self. Aviation has 
externalities that can not be overlooked. Direct emissions from aviation account for about 3 percent 
of the EU’s total green house gas emissions and more than 2 % of global emissions. CO2 emissions 
from aviation have been included in the EU ETS since 2012. The system has so far successfully 
contributed to reducing the carbon footprint of the aviation sector. That is the fact. Operational 
measures, such as modernizing and improving air traffic management technology procedures and 
systems are also reducing aviation emissions, and in addition, thanks to new aircraft technologies, 
cleaner fuels and a renewal of the fleet over time, emissions today are 40 % per kM flown lower 
than they where in 1992. As you know, CORSIA is the first ever global scheme for aviation. It 
delivers and builds on the Paris agreement and it also delivers on the aviation strategy as well as the 
European strategy for low emission mobility. Both  
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highlighted the importance of an ambitious agreement to tackle international aviation emissions. I 
was privileged to be in Montreal when the agreement was reached today the European Commission, 
the EU member states and your selves are working hard to maintain the environmental integrity of 
CORSIA. That’s why, we have put a lot of emphasis on financial and technical assistance to help 
countries implement the scheme. So far, we have three projects worth a total of 70 million euro. All 
EU member states have volunteered to participate in the CORSIA pilot phase through the Bratislava 
declaration. Worldwide 76 states have committed representing almost 76 % of international aviation 
activities. We should actively work together to help increase the number of participants, India for 
example, will implement CORSIA’s MRV system, and this is a very positive signal.  
That being said, it is true that CORSIA falls short of Europes ambition in some aspects and many 
uncertainties remain with regards CORSIA’s effectiveness. But ETS alone, even with its highest 
ambition will not be sufficient to effectively address global aviation emissions. Together we must 
siege this opportunity and if we fail to do so now, we will enrevoll years of work. One measure does 
not exclude the other and I am inviting you to work with us in this spirit. CORSIA is subject to a 
review every three years and can be reviewed and improved well before the end of the pilot phase. 
The EU will continue to push for robust and effective rules. The global consensus of CORSIA 
remains fragile as I mentioned I took part in the final discussion in June this year and I can ensure 
you that many countries remained reluctant to commit to a measure they perceive as a threat to their 
sovereignty and enhurdel to the development of their aviation industry. The EU must continue to 
signal its intent to participate in CORSIA to generate momentum for implementation. Any 
reservation about CORSIA could jeopardize the whole multilateral progress and the progress maid 
so far. And that is why we are leading by example and already implementing the CORSIA MRV 
already this year. As you know, discussion are still ongoing with respect to eligible offsets and the 
sustainable criteria for eligible fuels. What influence will Europe have in this discussion if the EU 
withdraw its support for CORSIA now. The best way to improve CORSIA is to continue to 
influence its design within ICAO. The Commission’s proposal for the union position to be taken by 
the EU member states in their reply to CORSIA state letter is full in line with the provision of ETS 
directive. It is a fact that certain differences currently exist between CORSIA and the EU ETS, we 
don’t hide that. And that is why once all the CORSIAs instruments are adopted by ICAO, the 
Commission will carry out in-depth assessment of the scheme and present a report to co legislators.  
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The EU will decide on the basis of that report how to implement CORSIA and what rules should 
apply on flights within the EU economic area. I am personally convinced we can find ways to 
combine CORSIA and the EU:s ETS in a way that is consistent with EU commitments under the 
Paris agreement and does not jeopardize ICAO’s efforts in favor of a global solutions. 
Madam honorable chair, honorable members, European citizens should be able to travel by air 
while leaving a minimum footprint. And this is why the future growth of aviation goes hand in hand 
with sustainable policies. Our objectives is simple, to reduce Co2 emissions from aviation. That is 
no doubt about that. Together our job is twofold, to obtain the most ambitious deal possible within 
ICAO with the widest possible international coverage while not jeopardizing the EU ETS for 
aviation. Once all the CORSIA instruments have been adopted by ICAO the Commission will carry 
out an in-depth assessment of the scheme and present a report to co-legislators. And I am therefore 
inviting you to please support this process, so that together we can assure that aviation becomes 
greener in a very controlled and sustainable manner.  
Thank you very much. 
Questions from the members of the European Parliament   
J. Girling 
Thank you madam chair, thank you commissioner for your presentation. I do have a couple of very 
straight forward and simple observations and questions. I agree with you, and indeed this committee 
has and the Parliament have gone along with the idea that Europe must lead by example and indeed 
I guess we think we have been. Maybe where we would departure that we consider that we should 
continue to lead by example and that means that we need to insist on real ambition within this 
CORSIA scheme, which nobody I think in parliament has ever pretend is our preferred way of 
doing things but we have held our oath and said okay we go with it we go with you with your 
recommendations. But we have always been very clear. And I am now less clear having listening to 
you than I was before because you said that this CORSIA delivers and builds on the Paris strategy, 
which I would absolutely disagree with you I do not think it does, because our Paris commitments  
           
!57
                      (Transcript Page 4) 
can not in my view be delivered by CORSIA. But then you went on and said that it was not good 
enough and that we need to improve it so I am slightly confused where you think CORSIA is 
actually going to take us. But given that it is this committee that is responsible for climate change 
and climate change action I would very politely say that I think that is wrong and that we are not 
going to deliver with the scheme. However I accept that we say that we will go along with it so I 
don’t understand how we could be in a position where you would recommend that we do not file a 
reservation by the first of December. When by not doing so it binds us in to accepting the 
environmental measures in CORSIA and not allowing anything further in other words it gets rid of 
our own EU ETS for aviation. Now I think it is very clear that that is the case and I have not heard 
you say that is defiantly not the case so I ask you again why given the uncertainties that you your 
self have just acknowledged still exist in CORSIA not least the environmental issues, why will you 
not go ahead with encouraging that reservation and indeed although while we accept that as a union 
we have a different legal status we could still put forward a reservation and it would be my belief 
we should do so and I would ask you to state very clearly why you think that is not the case. 
Because I have to tell you my recent experience we recently had a trip to China where they laughed 
at us when we talked about CORSIA and basically said well, we are not doing anything. I recently 
went to an event in London where I spoke with many people from the airlines and people from DG 
CLIMA to and it was absolutely clear that it is the absolute intention of everyone else involved in 
this to make sure the EU does not continue to reserve its position on the EU ETS. And I think it is 
absolutely essential that we do so, so please can you tell me why we are not going to do so by the 
first of December.   
S. Dance 
Thank you commissioner for outlining your thoughts, obvious we agree a lot with what just has 
been said, particular the fact that this level of ambition that we know of in CORSIA is far from 
sufficient for meeting our climate commitment on the Paris, but of course everything that has also 
been said about the need for this place to demonstrate the highest possible ambition in everything 
we do when it comes to climate. And of course there is a simple principle here that the review that 
will be undertaken by the Commission into the effectiveness of CORSIA, we should not of course 
pre-judge that review. And that is why I agree a reservation is necessary. I am just a little bit 
confused because I thought that you where proposing a reservation but I could have got that  
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completely wrong and my two questions are really, I mean I agree completely, reservation is 
necessary, it would be great if you could clarify your position on that, but secondly why we waiting 
into the very last moment on these things, I mean the first of December is not very long, it has been 
a lot of industry pressure to make sure that decisions on a reservation are delayed, delayed delayed 
until practically it is impossible to implement. And that is one of the fears that I have now, which is 
that even if it where possible within the council to get that reservation ratified is it even legislative 
possible, with the time frame that we got?  
Thank you. 
B. Eickhout  
Given a bit the quit fundamental issue of the questions, I would like to have an answer before we 
continue, because I think everyone wants to know very clearly, I mean there is a letter of decent on 
the table as far as we know, so as far as we know the commission is pursuing that that before the 
first of December we will come to that, to that position. That would be good to hear then we can 
continue the discussion, otherwise we are probably asking the same question.          
Violeta Bulc 
Okey, I need to be very careful what I am going to say now, because we have discussed this very 
often and as I said many times is that we have adopted our proposal which clearly states that there is 
differences between CORSIA and EU ETS. And I think that EU member states will be filing their 
differences by the first of December, so what I want to say, is that this is not, the conversation is not 
over yet. And we have been very much involved in a discussion with our colleagues from CLIMA, 
with you from the parliament, and also and of course taking a close look at the analysis that have 
been maid in order to proceed with enough level of confidence into this negotiations. Studies show 
us that in 2021 to 2035 ETS will sort of cover 956 empty CO2 emissions. When if we take a look at 
the CORSIA that in the similar period, in the same period, will represent 2711 empty [CO2 
emissions]. So for me, this is a huge motivation in order to get CORSIA onboard. And, I understand 
in a way frustration because we believe we have a better system than that the world wants to 
commit to. But the pollution does not know the boarders, and for me it is a  
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huge motivation to get the world behind the commitments in order to get the global effect going. 
You say that China already said that they are not joining. I would be cautious in making statements 
like that. India was very much reluctant and now we see a very concrete step by India. If China 
makes a step and of course they will do it in their own dynamic, and well if Russia reconsider their 
position, then I believe we will have a very concrete deliverables on the climate agenda.  
I have never said that we will commit with no conditions. I ask for this parliament to stick with us 
until 2021 to see how much we can bring onboard, how many member states will actually enter the 
voluntary phase. As you know we are close to 90, and because of the technical reasons, 
administrative I should say, China asked to be removed from the list of voluntary participation. I 
still hope that they will come back. And I do hope that India will come onboard fully, specially 
because of their very committed climate agenda that is emerging now on a monthly basis. Again, we 
will not commit for every price, but if there is a hope we can get a solid global agreement going, 
this will on a global scale contribute to climate change by fare more than just the EU ETS. But as 
you know, we working with our colleagues from CLIMA, to align these two mechanisms, and I 
know that we will be with you, communicating with you on every single step that we are going to 
make or commit. So again, I know the emotions towards the ETS, I wish we could isolate ourself 
and say we are going with our model, we would ensure clean air for Europe, but we wont, because 
if we don’t get global agreement, if with we do not get global commitments, pollutions will still 
come to European airspace. 
M. Demesmaeker. (translated) 
Yes,  
I speak Dutch.  
Madam Commissioner, we have heard that you have been prudent, but I have to say al of this is a 
bit like the Delphi oracle at the moment, non the less I agree with those that have spoken already in 
this committee and indeed in the transport committee we have often talked about this particular 
issue and as you have already pointed out, the aviation sector accounts for 2 percent of global Co2 
emissions and 3 percent of European emissions overall. Now, achieving our climate goals is hugely  
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important, I think we all agree so, it is clear that we need to talk about this sector, but nine days 
before the deadline the Commission’s slowness and indeed sluggishness is something very 
worrying and the same holds true of Council. They are really dragging their position because if we 
introduce any reserves on CORSIA by the first of December, European EMTS will be completely 
undermined. And as far as European Union has concerned this would be a very definite step 
backwards. I have seen studies that indicate that CORSIA does not provide enough guarantees in 
terms of achieving our climate goals. You have also said that no commitments would be maid 
without any conditions, but equally I hear doubt in your voice when you speak, I mean why are you 
not apply some pressure here Commissioner? When you first took the floor, you said that CORSIA 
and the ETS could be combined, could you run that by us, how is that going to work, how are you 
going to combine these two systems? There you go, I leave it with that. 
G.J Gerbrandy 
Yes thank you madam chair, and I am afraid I share the same confusion as a few others. For me this 
whole CORSIA process has been like sailing through xx, it is closing between two evils. Going 
with CORSIA is one way but we know that it will by far be sufficient to get where we want to to be 
within the Paris agreement but not doing CORSIA and going alone might take us even further away 
from Paris. So that is the very difficult choice between the two. One thing for me is absolutely clear, 
that European member states that are active within CORSIA should have a unified position and they 
should before the first of December, coordinated by a strong European Commission, show their 
decent with the way CORSIA is being applied now and risking that the ETS system will never be 
used next to the CORSIA system so I think that is very crucial and that is something that I look 
forward to further answers from the Commissioner. My second point that I would like to make is 
more focusing on the airline sector but also there I think politicians play a crucial role. There is 
something I simply do not understand, and that is why the sector is shying away from all their 
responsibilities. What they actually doing is gambling on our weakness that the only model is 
growth growth growth, and of course using cooking oil is wonderful but it is by far not sufficient to 
have a clean airline future. So they are actually gambling on our weaknesses that in the end we will 
never say no to further growth of the aviation sector. I think that is a gamble that shows a complete 
lack of responsibility, something I don’t understand why is the sector not taking more responsibility. 
We have four billions airline passengers every year now and it is going to double in the coming 15  
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years, to 8 billion. Why doesn’t the sector take an initiatives for instance by asking 1 euro for every 
airline passenger. That means 4 billion euro per year now. And 8 billion euro in 15 years from now 
in creating a huge innovation found. Because the only solution to grow in the aviation sector is 
developing clean airplanes. And the only way to get there is by breakthrough technology, by 
spending a huge amount on innovation. It can not come from the public sector it has to come from 
the private sector as well. So my plea is, why don’t we force this sector much more strongly to go 
into that direction and that is something I ask the commissioner as well. Talk to them and show 
them their own responsibility, and that in the end we will not be as weak as they believe we will be. 
Thank you.  
B. Eickhout  
Thank you madam chair, thank you Commissioner, it is probably going to be a bit boring but I feel 
that everyone in the environment committee having the same questions. I thought that the situation 
was quite straight forwards. The Commission having looked at the SARPS that having been 
concluded. We know one part is concluded, the other part is still on going. But that until now what 
has been concluded is not giving enough clarity on the environmental integrity of CORSIA. 
Because we don’t know the offset rules are not agreed yet. The exact definition of what are 
alternative fuels is not defined yet. And it is quite crucial those offsetting rules for what we are 
going to do in CORSIA. So, the provisions are not clear yet for knowing whether CORSIA will 
have enough environmental integrity. And that is quite crucial in order to judge whether we go with 
our ETS system for all flights or not. But we need to judge that and we cant do that. So you have to 
make a reservation. And for now, that reservation, at least a proposal, is also on the table. And can I 
also there make a point on transparency. Still, formally that proposal of the Commission for a 
Council decision is not on the table. It is not being presented to the parliament formally, although 
we all have it because of Politico. So it is out there in the world, everyone has it, we talked about it, 
but formally the Commission is not sending it to us. This is a total ridiculous situation and that is 
really something that needs to change very quickly. But that is one part, then on the contents, I 
thought okey my main criticism would be the SARPs where agreed in June, why did it take so long 
to come up with a council, at least a proposal for a council decision, but we have until the first of 
December so lets work. To get to an EU position. Because you know, no matter what will happen 
that weakens if we go into a several directions. Where some member states would put a reservation  
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and others don’t. If you want to make us useless, pursue that strategy. I thought you where not. But 
now from you answers, I get the feeling that yes there is a text out that that is proposing a councils 
position, but you are not really pursuing anything after that so the text is out and you just hope that 
28 member states known for getting to a common position very easy on anything, they will just do 
that on this one. Without any clear guidance of the commission. I thought you are going to come up 
here with a strategy how the member states will come to that council position so that we have a 
strong reservation for the concerns on environmental integrity, knowing that we have a strong voice 
in the further negotiations. And now the answer is difficult, "I have to chose my words very 
carefully.” ”I do not know what exactly I can do.” Well then the outcome is that Europe will be 
divided and no matter what we will look weak in the further CORSIA negotiations. And that really 
surprises me. Why this change of strategy, are we still pursing one position and how are you going 
to do that so in order to have one position before the first of December and let me please be that this 
reservation that we have all have seen. I think I limit it to here, I had a lot of questions of the 
followup discussions but I think for now, these has become the key questions.  
Violeta Bulc 
Respectful members of the parliament, the confusion is on my side because when I hear your 
comments it is like you have not been part of the entire process from the beginning until now. That 
is where my confusion comes from. Because I have to chose my words very carefully because I 
don’t really know if you remember that we walked this path together. All the way. And it was very 
clearly stated that we are not in favor of reservations but differences that we will clearly state, what 
is the difference between ETS and CORSIA. And I am confused with your comments and your 
statements. Because it seems like we have been living in two different parts of the world but we 
walked the path together. I have been very clear in my communication from the day one. We want 
global deal because global deal will bring by far more benefits than a European deal. And now we 
are not filing a reservations because we are filing differences. And it seems like you, I mean, now I 
am not sure if you received the documents or not on your table. Have you received the documents? 
Do you see what we propose, what is the Commission proposal what is the Council proposal? Now 
I am really confused because of that. So maybe we should clarify, do we have the same documents 
on the table? Because this will really safeguard the EU ETS legislation. And this is what the august 
proposal and the council proposal and what they will be deciding on. I really would like to recall 
what we agreed on. We agreed, or I asked you for the  
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support to stay with us and to lobby as much as you can on your own, through your own channels, 
the same as we where, to get as many countries as possible on a volunteering base by 2021. If you 
are not going agree with the results of negotiations, we said that we going to come back and decide 
on ETS or CORSIA. But we are negotiating, we are not even halfway through. The most important 
part of negotiations is coming in march next year. Two out of three have been agreed on last week 
and one more is left over for spring. And again I will be very straight forward. I am agains filing the 
reservation, I am for stating the differences very clearly on ICAO level and making sure that they 
understand under which conditions we are entering this deal. But if EU shows weaknesses, if EU is 
not leading the way, then it is quite likely that this will not happen. We can for different reasons step 
away as the US did for the time being. Or we continue to motivate, I am in favor of dialog and 
persuasion and showing the way how the growing the countries that will of course grow their 
aviation even much faster than EU because they are just about to establish the middle class and the 
middle class wants to travel. You know who I am talking about, I am talking about China, I am 
talking about India. And that is why the Commission is pushing so much for new technologies as 
well. We are encouraging and now co-financing the hybrid plane that we can actually get maybe the 
planes that do not pollute. Electrification, hybrid proportion systems and this is probably the way 
how we can also address these challenges. In Europe as you know we trying to lover the impact of 
aviation by supporting the high speed trains up to the five-six hundred kilometer distance. And we 
will continue to do so, to reduce the need for aviation. But as far as the decarbonization scheme is 
concerned, I would certainly like to feel your support in order to continue to negotiate very firmly 
but with a very honest commitment to get a global deal going. Again, the figures and statistics show 
it self. If we are alone and just push for ETS the results will be by far smaller and weaker than if we 
get a global deal going. Even if it is not going to be 100% in accordance with our demands. But we 
will get credibility to continue to move, to continue to push for decarbonization. If it is anybody, I 
am very much in favor of decarbonization of transport. And we have done a lot and we will 
continue to fight, you see what kind of incredible move was maid in IMO. And now aviation is 
challenged because IMO is much more ambitious now than ICAO and we will try to use that and 
get the leverage and get ICAO to move as well. So again, I hope that you have the proper 
information on your table and that we do deal with the same type of documents. Because that is 
where my confusion started to come from. That is why I said that I had to be very careful with what 
I said because I did not understand even your comments. I really apologies for that.  
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Thank you madam commissioner. I welcome your ambition on aviation emissions. Now, in talking 
about conferences about climate change keynote speakers always say that the xx for 
decarbonization is tighter we need to get on with it if we want to achieve it. In a meeting of the 
trilateral commission in Ljubljana I was able to hear experts talking about an aviation revolution 
and they felt that we need to be active on a number of fronts. We need to promote electric planes, 
hybrid planes. But plead that decarbonization is still going to remain a very serious issue on the 
agenda for a number of years. Now, obvious, I welcome measure such as CORSIA but making this 
voluntary is really quite problematic. This voluntary nature is suppose to last from 2021 to 2026, 
you actually talked about a number of different processes. But given that, would it not be a good 
idea to accelerate this, how can we get more dynamic into all of this?  
C. Zorrinho 
Thank you vey much madam commissioner. I think some of the confusion you mentioned is down 
to the completely different tone that we heard from you, the tone in your introductory remarks in the 
one hand and contrast that with your reply to MEPs. Now, your presentation, your initial 
presentation was one where you expressed your concerns, you referred to the unstable and 
voluntary nature of this system that it is insufficient developed that the European response needs 
improvement. But then, MEPs asked you question, and you said yes European countries where in 
fact going to show a consistent front to obtain better results and so forth, but we got to back that up 
with facts, we can not just wish it into happening. We know that the European Union has been 
hugely ambitious, that is only the case in the European parliament, we have done a lot on road 
transport, on rail transport, so aviation and maritime transport can not be the exceptions. So we need 
clarity. What is the alternative strategic line. What can I, as an MEP say to people back home? What 
can I say to the media back home? How can I say that there are guarantees that member states will 
have a strong position, that we will lead by example and also be united on the basis of the position, 
you are mentioning the United states, and I like to ask you whether the United States are or are not 
our allies in this whole process. Thank you. 
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Thank you madam chairman, Commissioner. Well there are very different assessment on what 
CORSIA can and does achieve, I would urge you to read parliament text on this. We believe 
CORSIA is really very weak and that the way it is shaped it is not entirely down with what we want. 
Well, saying that is actually not accurate, there is only about 20 percent of it that is in line with what 
we want. And what you have is not clear at all in comparison to EU ETS which works. So, I think 
you have got to be careful with what you said in terms of the results of CORSIA once. As J. Girling 
said we are in favor of in so far of it is a beginning, but only because of that, it is an initial step, but 
it is not acceptable if our rights as EU legislator for EU ETS are limited. We got a bit confused on 
this. We don’t have a document. So the question is why don’t we have a document? It is not you 
who should ask us why have we not read it, it is we who should ask you have we not got the 
document? You cant criticize us for not reading a document not made available to us I am terrible 
sorry but that just is not good enough. You want to chose the best legislative instrument that will 
guarantee the European Unions ability to decide and that of course is crucial for the European 
parliament. But okay, we have a reservation fair enough. But if you say that the legal instrument 
you have chosen is the one xx just say so. I mean let's not beat about the bush. If we got the right 
legal instrument and it is well grounded than we have grants to be assure, I urge you, in your 
discussion with the member states, to make the following remark. We need more measures on 
CORSIA if we are to deliver on our Paris commitments. It is an international agreement to which 
we are committed. And please, I would urge you to spell things out to member states, if we don’t 
have a proper legal instrument by the first of December, and if the EU is able to decide whatever 
they want on EU ETS then we have got an EU institutional crisis on our hands. The European 
Parliament has been in favor of this, of EU ETS. You can not ignore the European parliament, and 
that has got to be understood. If the member states are delaying or downfolding, you need to do a 
bit of persuasion. Thank you.   
J Guteland 
Thank you chair and thank you madam commissioner for being here and for your presentation. I 
want to raise questions about the EU climate target 2030 and in relation to the CORSIA and how it 
will be affected. Because I believe and it has also been a statement in a resolution in front of COP24 
that we must raise our ambition when it comes to our 2030 targets, and now I am also a bit worried  
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here. Because given that EU has committed to meet its 2030 target without relying on international 
credits, how will the Commission propose to avoid that any potential implementation of CORSIA 
undermines the 2030 objectives with credits that can not be taken into account in the measurements 
of the unions progress towards its climate targets. And I also want to ask given that the ICAO target 
of net 2020 is substantially weaker than the EU at least 40 percent target, how will the Commission 
propose to avoid that any potential implementation of CORSIA undermines our target. Thank you.  
A. Schreijer-Pierik (Translated) 
Thank you. I am not going to put any questions for the commissioner, but madam Commissioner 
would have liked to put a question we have been talking about the climate agreement in the 
Netherlands, now we are going even further than what Europe has decided to do. We have got all 
the sectors, we talked with all the SMEs, farmers, with very important objectives and this is what 
we do in the Netherlands so what is happening and what are the requirements and the rights of the 
aviation sector and that other sectors, I can actually not explain what additional rights would be and 
this is what we need to answer today. Because the requirements laid down on other sectors are 
extremely difficult. And when you take a look at the sky and see requirements are not the same 
everywhere, then I don’t know what to answer, so we need clear figures to show that things are 
moving forward. Thank you.   
G. Meissner 
Thank you very much chair, thank you very much Commissioner. Since time is advance I try to be 
short. In my questions, first question. All you said that ICAO is not as ambitious as IMO right now, 
IMO is faster that was unexpected. What can be don to accelerate ICAO? Can it be done through 
member states? Or through aviation agreements or whatever? And to next question, how many 
countries are already part of it voluntarily and can that be pushed for example by aviation 
agreements? Because this is a method that we have maybe to talk with other member states, with 
other countries over the globe to join this movement and then another question because you talked 
about innovation, there is several things in place, you mentioned hybrid planes and there of course it 
is only plans as far as I know only, to have electricity for the taxiing on the airport. I hear about that 
for a long time but I did not see it yet so is it you to have it in the market and how much time will  
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there be needed in order to have it really and for example algae is a biofuel for aviation, now 
without emission discussed for a long time but not yet there, do you know anything about these 
innovations because that is very important to push it forward as well. And just a comment if you 
would have a single in European skies in Europe much things would be better but we don’t have it 
yet and we can not change it I know.  
Violeta Bulc 
Thank you very much also for all this comments and questions. First, because there where several 
half questions on technology from several of you MEPs. Allow me just to explain that we have 
several initiatives already ongoing, besides this is our of course that is taking care of the 
optimization of the aviation space and its more efficient management. We are investing a lot now in 
new technologies, through clean skies but also through other instruments. One of them is 
undertaken now by Rolls Royce I believe plus their partners to develop the hybrid proportions 
systems which would of course bring a completely different type of quality to aviation. This take 
time, they said that they will deliver by 2030. So, if that happens, we can of course count on a new 
generation of airplanes also on a service level. In general aviation and small planes and drones, for 
example drones in particular we are already put into legislation that they need to be zero emission. 
Flying cars or drones which ever we will use. So can we speed it up, yes we can if we can have a bit 
more resources, so let's hope that the Commission’s proposal for the next financial period will be 
accepted as soon as possible and we can engage immediately with the new programs. Where in 
transport, decarbonation represents for the new financial period over 60 percent of all investments. 
And that will touch also the aviation. I am hoping that, as I already mentioned, that we will be able 
to develop new artificial fuels, we are pushing aviation biofuels. But all together, it will not deliver 
on a vision zero by 2050 so they will have to be the emerging of something new that will contribute 
to the overall vision zero agenda. So that is why I count on innovation. I am glad that transport got 
much larger, at least we proposed much larger amount of investments in innovation in transport in 
the new financial period. I can only hope that this house and the council will agree with us. Then 
the emergence of new will happen even faster.  
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As far as the different other option how we can deal with aviation and I have heard the questions 
regarding also the taxes or the way how its compare to other modes. In this formal council, in 
December 3, we will give two member states the preliminary report on our really full fledge 
analysis of all taxes in all modes in all member states, and that will give us a much clearer picture 
about the position of aviation in an overall multimodal environment. A complete analysis per mode 
per member states will be complete probably by March/April next year. But I can share with you, in 
the same manner as we will share with the council, the preliminary report which is already showing 
some very concrete results, but I can not talk about the yet because we are in the final phase of 
putting everything together. So that will give us hopefully some additional chance to follow up also 
in aviation with other means. Regarding this document. If I was, maybe I was informed incorrectly I 
can take that as a part of it, but I was told that the document was submitted to you on the 31 of 
October. That all of you got the new version of the document, the one that I am referring to. And the 
fact is that I would like to re-stress that you will see in this document that we made the proposal to 
safeguard the EU ETS, also against legal challenges. And that is another element that was very 
much on our mind when we proposed that instead of reservation we focused on differences. And 
point out these differences and then of course bring them together, this our intention, to bring 
together ETS and CORSIA. I also like to say that whatever we agree will not go into force before 
2020. That gives us enough time that we do a thorough impact assessment analysis of the full 
scheme. Which of course at this point we still not know what is going to exactly be, but we will 
continue to negotiate and hopefully in march we will know and once this is adopted, we can then do 
the analysis, we can do the impact assessment and we can follow it through and of course report 
back to you and to the council about the results, how do we foresee them, the development of 
Corsia net effects. So this is what you where asking us for and we will of course certainly do it.  
When you asked me how can you help, let's not forget that we have 8 seats in ICAO, 8 out of 46. So 
how can you help, lobby with countries that have not decided to join us, help us to lobby with them. 
We will certainly continue to do so. And I believe again if we can get India fully onboard and the 
way how they are communicating and the way how they are committing themself to green agenda, I 
believe that there is a hope. And if we can hold the space that China decides to come onboard as 
well I think we can be very successful in this approach. But of course it is not a done deal yet, I 
fully agree with you, so we need to continue to fight, continue to persuade, continue to intensify our 
discussion and negotiation. And again, we will not comply with any deal, we where very clear with  
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that. And every time at ICAO in Montreal, to everyone, we say that very clearly. We need to have 
an ambitious deal in order to deliver concrete results, but let's give the global deal a chance.   
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